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Questions about the scope and content of the duty to "seek justice"
pervade prosecutorial work. Prosecutors are required to serve in a dual
role: they are both advocates seeking conviction and "ministers of
justice."I Observers have complained about a tendency on the part of
prosecutors to prefer the former of these "schizophrenic" 2 obligations
to the latter. This is commonly described as a tendency to behave over-
zealously or according to a "conviction psychology. '" 3
1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 comment (1981) ("A prosecutor
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate") [hereinafter
MODEL RULESI; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 3-1.1(b) (2d ed. 1980) ("The prosecutor is
both an administrator of justice and an advocate. The prosecutor must exercise sound discretion
....") [hereinafter STANDARDS; STANDARDS, § 3-1.1(c) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek
justice, not merely to convict.").
2. Steele, Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965, 982 (1984).
3. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U.L. REV. 98, 99 (1975); Reiss,
Public Prosecutors and Criminal Prosecution in the United States of America, 20 JURID. REV.
NEw SERVICE 1, 11 (1975) ("[The prosecution] is preoccupied with a record of punishments ...
Vol. 15:197 (1988)
Virtuous Prosecutor
Overzealousness allegedly causes two sorts of difficulty. First, it
leads to formal "misconduct," i.e., behavior which violates the law
4
and/or professional disciplinary codes. Recently, this problem has
risen to the surface of professional attention. 5 Professor Francis Allen
has concluded that "minimizing prosecutorial excesses is one of this
country's great unsolved problems in criminal law administration."
' 6
Scholars7 and appellate judges8 point with dismay to recurring instances
of prosecutorial misconduct. They stress the courts' reluctance to
reverse criminal convictions even when misconduct is egregious. 9
Instead, courts'0 generously apply doctrines of fundamental fairness, t"
the chief concern of the prosecutor falls on the processing of cases rather than the doing ofjustice
.... .(emphasis in original)).
4. See, e.g., Golden, Selling Out, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Aug. 24, 1986, at 37 (the case of
former Assistant United States Attorney David Twomey, convicted of conspiracy to obstruct
justice for leaking information to a fugitive defendant). The prosecutor's unlawful conduct will
generally also constitute a disciplinary offense, but of course the reverse is rarely true: most
disciplinary violations do not rise to the level of illegality.
Nor does all misconduct stem from "overzealousness." Most disciplinary cases concerning
alleged prosecutorial misconduct involve such violations as embezzlement, conflicts of interest and
failure to enforce the law. See Steele, supra note 2, at 970; Annotation, Disciplinary Action
Against Attorney for Misconduct Related to Performance of Official Duties as Prosecuting Attor-
ney, 10 A.L.R. 4TH 605, 610-11 (1981).
5. Observers expressing concern about the problem's existence and the inadequacy of exist-
ing remedies range from state governors (see Carey, The Role of a Prosecutor in a Free Society,
12 CRIM. L. BULL. 317, 323 (1976)) to radical critics (see, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, 79-98 (1975); Rabinowitz, The Prosecutor: The Duty to Seek
Justice, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 231 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976). See also Steele, supra
note 2, at 967 (misconduct is increasing and abuses "deliberately calculated"); Gershman, The
Burger Court and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 217 (1985); B. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1987); Dershowitz, Foreivard to J. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MIS-
CONDUCT at ix (1985).
6. Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice in the
Courts of Review, 70 IOWA L. REV. 311, 335 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 5, at ix ("[p]rosecutorial misconduct . . . is ramp-
ant."); J. LAWLESS, supra note 5, at 3 ("The ethics of the modern American prosecutor have
become highly questionable.").
8. See, e.g., United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43, 44 (Ist Cir. 1985).
9. Motives aside from a reluctance to free the guilty have been suggested, including loyalty
to the separation of powers doctrine (see Steele, supra note 2, at 967-69), and judges' sympathy
for prosecutorial zealousness arising from their own earlier experiences as prosecutors. See Law-
less & North, Prosecutorial Misconduct: A Battleground in Criminal Law, 20 TRIAL 10, 27-28
(1984).
10. One scholar has accused the Supreme Court of "refusfing] to articulate or even require
ethical standards of prosecutors" and of "encouraging prosecutorial overreaching." Gershman,
supra note 5, at 218.
11. Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2472-73 (1986), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 24
(1986); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1985).
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harmless error12 and "invited response" 13 to uphold convictions.
Other controls on prosecutorial misconduct are criticized as equally
ineffective. 14
Critics of overzealousness state or imply a second, more funda-
mental complaint, having to do with underlying values and attitudes.'
5
In this view overzealousness is manifested in a distorted, though tech-
nically proper, exercise of permissible discretion where the prosecutor
unduly prefers penal severity over other potential goals. Depending on
the procedural stage and context, overzealousness might appear as
undue preference for:
-prosecuting rather than dismissing a case;
-"highest and most" charging,1 6 i.e., for charging a defendant
with more, and more serious, crimes rather than fewer, less serious ones;
-interpreting substantive criminal law expansively, and procedural
protections narrowly;
-winning as many convictions as possible;
-obtaining severe penalties over lenient ones.
This type of overzealousness is problematic; as it is less visible than
formal misconduct, it is harder to combat.
Observers have proposed a number of measures to combat over-
zealousness. Some have focused on the incentives offered pros-
ecutors.' 7 Thus, one writer proposed legislating financial inducements
for prosecutors to act in "the public interest.'1 8 Other critics, focusing
12. See Skandier, 758 F.2d at 45 (reluctantly applying the harmless error rule as required by
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983)).
13. Young, 470 U.S. at 11. The Supreme Court takes defense counsel's preceding conduct
into account "not to excuse [prosecutorial misconduct] but to determine [its] effect on the trial as
a whole." Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2472.
14. Prosecutorial misconduct rarely triggers contempt sanctions. See Carey, supra note 5,
at 323 (referring to a 1973 study in New York City which found, over a twenty-five year period,
no instance of a prosecutor held in contempt for courtroom misconduct in a criminal prosecution).
Nor, because of prosecutorial immunity, are civil damage actions common. See Steele, supra note
2, at 984 n. 12. In some jurisdictions, according to Steele, it is uncertain whether the separation
of powers doctrine even permits enforcement of professional ethics codes against prosecutors, Id.
at 967-69.
15. See, e.g., J. LAWLESS, supra note 5, at 17 ("The competitive and combative nature of
modem adversary proceedings . . . has changed many prosecutors from champions of justice to
advocates of victory."); Felkenes, supra note 3, at 110-15.
16. See Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 85
(1968).
17. "[Rleform proposals that do not both acknowledge the effect of incentives and seek to
alter them are likely to fail." J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JusTcE 298 (1977).
18. Comment, Incentives vs. Nonpartisanship: The Prosecutorial Dilemma in An Adversary
System, 1981 DUKE L.J. 311, 333-37. See also Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, 22





on the prosecutor's desire to win convictions, have urged trial and
appellate courts to make greater efforts to prevent and deter pros-
ecutorial misconduct, including greater readiness to reverse convic-
tions.19 Still others would adopt more detailed ethical standards2" or
stimulate the use of bar discipline by requiring investigation of pros-
ecutorial forensic misconduct whenever it occurs. 21
My focus in this Article is different. While I agree that both incen-
tives and deterrents are important, I think a large part of the problem
lies in our failure to give prosecutors a coherent understanding of their
quasi-judicial role.22  Discussions of prosecutorial duty in the
literature 23 tend to remain either on the level of broad platitudes or,
when addressed to particular practices, to lack a coherent framework.
In light of prosecutors' broad discretion, 24 and the pressures on them to
19. Allen, supra note 6, at 336; Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for
Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C.L. REV. 693, 737 (1987) (urging reversal of conviction
when prosecutor has committed "bad faith" suppression of exculpatory evidence); Note, Prosecu-
torial Misconduct: The Limitations Upon the Prosecutor's Role As an Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1095, 1112-13 (1980) (urging, inter alia, stricter "harmless error" test).
20. See THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT ch. 9 (rev. draft, May 1982).
21. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO LAWYER MISCONDUCT, 1.12 (1984) (ABA would require trial
and appellate courts to refer observed misconduct to appropriate disciplinary bodies); Rosen, supra
note 19, at 735-36 (bar counsel's office should screen appellate cases); Steele, supra note 2, at 982
(proposes legislatively created "Prosecutor Grievance Council" to investigate complaints and
administer sanctions; would require inquiry whenever appellate court expressly or implicitly finds
prosecutor acted unethically).
22. See Aronson, Professional Responsibility: Education and Enforcement, 51 WASH. L.
REV. 273, 313-14 (1976). Aronson argues that under the current system most prosecutors
understandably choose an "adversary" approach. Id. at 313. "Law schools and ethics commit-
tees can advise no differently," he argues, until the Bar resolves its present ambivalence and
chooses a "system model" of lawyering-one that is either "adversary-oriented" or "truth-
oriented." Id. at 313-14, n. 124. Meanwhile, Aronson maintains, we cannot coherently educate
lawyers in ethics, or enforce ethical rules. Id. at 287-89. I disagree. I cannot imagine we would
want to reduce the prosecutor's dual role to a monistic one, and I think we can do better at
coherently educating prosecutors about their current role.
23. Although the post-Watergate years have seen an explosion of literature on professional
responsibility, relatively little has been written on prosecutorial ethics. Only recently has much
been written about prosecutorial ethics in general, as opposed to particular ethical issues. Some
major works are M. FREEDMAN, supra note 5; Steele, supra note 2; Uviller, The Virtuous Prose-
cutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (1973).
Two treatises have recently appeared: B. GERSHMAN, supra note 5 and J. LAWLESS, supra note
5. Bennett Gershman has also written an article on standards for measuring prosecutorial mis-
conduct, forthcoming in the AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW. See also Belsky, On Becoming
and Being a Prosecutor, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1485 (1984) (reviewing D. NISSMAN & E. HAGEN,
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1982)); Cf. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attor-
ney-New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1980) (discussing the ethical prob-
lems surrounding defense of a guilty and dangerous defendant).
24. Barring unlikely radical changes in our criminal justice system and the prosecutor's role
within it (see Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J.
338 (1982)), prosecutors will continue to exercise broad discretion beyond the reach of agency
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adopt a "conviction mentality," we have created a vacuum in which
prosecutorial overzealousness and misconduct can flourish. If I am
right, then the remedies are first, to define the prosecutor's role more
precisely and second, to educate and support prosecutors in that role.
This Article attempts to accomplish the first task and discusses one
approach to the second. It draws both on academic sources (legal and
philosophical) and on the prosecution experiences of my students and
myself in Boston-area lower criminal courts. 25 A case prosecuted by
one of my students raises the general issue.
The Vietnam Veteran Case
The thirty-year-old defendant was caught red-handed shoplifting
from a department store. He had had a clean record until he went to
Vietnam. There he won two Purple Hearts and a Presidential Citation.
He also became addicted to heroin. By the time of the current offense,
the defendant had an extensive criminal record, including several
assaults and batteries, larcenies, and six armed robberies for which he
had served time in state prison. He was paroled several months prior
to his shoplifting and had not been arrested until the current incident.
The student read a report from defendant's psychiatrist stating that
defendant was on methadone maintenance, was seeing the doctor
regularly, and was "making a great deal of progress." According to
the report, a sequence of stressful events within a two-week period had
triggered the current offense: the defendant's wife left him, he was
fired from his job, and he was mugged.
Defense counsel asked the student if, in view of the circumstances,
she would agree to dismiss or file 26 the charge. Rejecting that path, the
student wanted to recommend a short, suspended jail term, probation,
and continued drug treatment. But her instructor/supervisor disagreed.
In view of defendant's criminal record, she strongly advised the student
to recommend incarceration. Feeling that jail would be counter-
productive for the defendant, the student resisted, 27 but experienced
guidelines, rules of professional conduct, disciplinary bodies, or appellate courts. See infra text
accompanying notes 36-38, 232-34.
25. Several years ago I spent a sabbatical leave prosecuting criminal cases in the Boston-area
lower courts. When I returned, I began teaching professional responsibility to students enrolled in
the Boston University Criminal Law Clinical Program, some of whom prosecuted cases under
supervision. In this article, I have made liberal use of materials from this program. Statements
of my students are quoted without identifying the speaker to preserve anonymity.
26. "Filing" charges in Massachusetts has the effect of terminating the case without a deci-
sion on the merits, dismissal, or nolle prosse. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 277, § 70B (West 1972).
27. In the end, she recommended probation to the judge, who was even more lenient: he
continued the defendant's case without any adjudication" of the charges.
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considerable doubt about her role. This was exacerbated when the pro-
bation officer involved in the case mistook her for defense counsel,
explaining, "I knew you said [you were a] prosecutor but.., you were
so nice that I just thought you were defense counsel, . . . you're too
nice to be an ADA." Afterwards the student wrote about the case:
The major professional responsibility issue I faced was
simply-what exactly is my job as prosecutor and what did I
owe this defendant? .... The only28 provision [of the profes-
sional responsibility rules] that guided me was the "duty to
seek justice and not merely to convict,' '29 which is incredibly
vague. This did seem to be the case where justice needed to
be served, and there were many more competing interests than
the one to convict .... I began thinking-maybe I am being
too nice. Maybe I was getting too involved and shouldn't have
concerned myself with defendant's record and welfare. What
exactly is my job as prosecutor?3 °
How would a "virtuous prosecutor" 31 have acted in this student's
shoes? Was she obliged to consider what disposition was "just" and to
seek only that? Should she have gone after the most severe penalty she
thought she could get? Was it proper, in deciding the "just" course, to
consider the defendant's rehabilitative needs? How should she have
reconciled the demands of "justice" for the defendant and his family
with potentially conflicting demands by the victimized department
store? With the demands of "justice" as formulated by the arresting
police department? With anticipated reactions from media and public?
Although my student's angst revolved around her fear that she was
acting "underzealously," her questions nicely pose the opposite ques-
tion: Would a different approach have been "overzealous?" Or sim-
ply appropriate? The remainder of this Article addresses these basic
questions. Part I considers what leads prosecutors to behave over-
zealously. I examine features of their work environment that make
their "previous pursuit of the elusive Lady of Justice become . ..a
faded memory. '"32 I then turn to definitions of the prosecutor's dual
role, especially the duty to "seek justice." Part II examines current
definitions of that role, including the "surrogate client" model and the
28. But see STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 3-3.8(a) (instructing prosecutors to "explore the
availability of noncriminal disposition, including programs of rehabilitation, formal or informal, in
deciding whether to press criminal charges. ... ).
29. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) (amended 1981) [here-
inafter MODEL CODE]; see also STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 3-1.1(c).
30. See supra note 25.
31. See Uviller, supra note 23. Professor Uviller's article served as the inspiration for the
title of this Article.
32. Lawless & North, supra note 9, at 27.
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"adversary stage" theory. Part Ill constructs a more detailed model
for understanding the quasi-judicial duty. I consider questions such
as: What goals other than penal severity are implied by the duty to
seek "justice"? Is it sometimes, or always, proper for prosecutors to
prefer penal severity to those competing 'goals? If so, when is that
proper? With the aid of a series of tables, which I continually revise as
the analysis progresses, I develop a framework for understanding,
reconciling and implementing the prosecutor's dual roles. I apply the
model principally to the Vietnam Veteran case, but also (more briefly)
to other contexts. Finally, in part IV, I discuss the implications of this
model for a prosecution agency wishing to foster virtuous conduct in its
ranks.
I. INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES TO BEHAVE "OVERZEALOUSLY"
Most writers contend that overzealousness is a widespread prob-
lem. 33 Assuming they are correct, why is this so? One can explain the
phenomenon by reference to various institutional factors that foster-or
fail to curb-'"conviction psychology." These include the nature of
prosecution agencies, the adversary system, and the system for enforc-
ing prosecutorial ethics.
A. The Nature of Prosecution Agencies
Prosecution agencies in the United States are numerous and their
practices, which have not been studied much, 34 vary according to such
factors as agency size, caseload, location, organization and governmen-
tal level. Generalized descriptions are therefore hazardous, though
necessary.
The prosecutor's great discretionary power is the cardinal fact of
professional life. Compared to the average government lawyer serving
in an administrative agency, the prosecutor's discretion is both broad
and seemingly unguided by legislation. Because prosecution agencies
do not generally try to control the discretion of line staff" either by
33. See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 7; Felkenes, supra note 3, at 110-11; Note, supra
note 19, 1095-96.
34. Felkenes, supra note 3, at 98; McDonald, Preface to THE PROSECUTOR 9-12 (W.
McDonald ed., 1979).
35. 1 recognize that the generalizations that follow do not describe the practices of many
individual prosecutors and prosecution agencies. Hopefully, these generalizations do reflect the
existing literature's discussion of prosecutorial practices. See id.
Vol. 15:197 (1988)
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internal regulations 36 or by close supervision, 37 individual prosecutors
typically exercise broad discretion, which is largely invisible and unre-
viewable. 3s The environment in which prosecutors exercise this power
is shaped by both external and internal pressures. Regarding the
former, Abraham Blumberg has written that "[tjhe central problem of
any prosecution office is its political character." ' 39  Political pressures
foster a "conviction psychology" because prosecutors can easily
demonstrate their "effectiveness" by pointing to conviction statistics.
40
As Blumberg writes, "[e]veryone in the criminal court . . . genuinely
feels he is being observed at all times .. . . Police, district attorneys,
judges, probation officers, lawyers, and even clerks arrange their
official behavior to suit the expectancies of those who will be watch-
ing. "41 Under scrutiny of the media, the police, courthouse co-
workers and victims, a prosecutor is more likely to win approval for
acting "tough on criminals" than for championing "fairness.' '42
36. The ABA has urged prosecution agencies to formulate office manuals to guide the exer-
cise of discretion. See STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 3-2.5. However, very few agencies have
done so. See Thomas & Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CiM. L. REV. 507, 517
(1976). Whether meaningful guidelines are possible to draft is debatable. Compare K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE passim (1969) and Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1562-66 (1981) (both advocating adoption of internal guidelines) with L.
CARTER, THE LIMITS OF ORDER, (1974) and Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971) (arguing the futility of trying to regulate
most forms of prosecutorial discretion). See also infra text accompanying notes 232-234.
37. See L. CARTER, supra note 36, at 49 ("the bulk of discretionary judgments [is placed]
at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy"); K. DAVIS, supra note 36, at 144 (noting "the
complete absence of supervisory power over . . . the power to prosecute or not to prosecute.");
J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 17, at 48, 85, 116-17, 152-54 (degree of supervision in
Baltimore, Chicago and Detroit). At some levels of practice, or in politically sensitive cases,
elected officials or their representatives may become more involved in case decision making. See
for example, the dilemmas facing government appellate counsel in the Japanese exclusion cases,
discussed in P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR passim (1983). In this Article, however, I focus on the
prosecutor's role in run-of-the-mill state criminal cases.
38. K. DAVIS, supra note 36, at 144; Vorenberg, supra note 36, at 1523-24.
39. A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 123 (2d ed. 1967); Felkenes, supra note 3, at 117
("The fact that the D.A.'s office is political stifles expressions of social ideals. The prosecutor
is supposed to prosecute and he is not expected to express sympathy for the defendants.").
40. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 106 ("Conviction statistics seem to most prosecutors a
tangible measure of their success."). See also J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 17, at 47
("Failure to obtain the expected number of convictions jeopardizes the career prospects of the
prosecutor . . . and makes both him and his staff vulnerable to public criticism ...."); Reiss,
supra note 3, at 10-11. On the general tendency of bureaucrats to define success in "measures
that are easily quantified and presented," see P. RUBIN, BuSINESS FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW:
THE EVOLUTION OF EFFICIENT RULES 116 (1983).
41. A. BLUMBERO, supra note 40, at 87 ("The key phrase used over and over again by all
[the court's] diverse groups is, 'Cover yourself!' ").
42. Id. See L. CARTER, supra note 36, at 83; J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 17, at
93, 96 (Baltimore), 166-67 (Detroit) for evidence of police, media, and community pressure for
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The internal climate of prosecution agencies may also promote
"conviction psychology." Traditionally, assistant prosecutor jobs have
been filled by beginning lawyers seeking trial experience before moving
on to more lucrative private practice. 43 Their overall training is
inadequate44 and includes little if any formal instruction in ethics'.45
Nor have most prosecutors studied ethics in any detail in law school.
Together, these characteristics-youth, inexperience and lack of
instruction in ethical obligations-render prosecutors particularly
vulnerable to influence by their more experienced peers. If the veterans
communicate conviction-oriented values, clearly that is the strongest
message we can expect young prosecutors to receive.
Counter-pressure to be "fair" exists ,46 but often pales next to
pressures to demonstrate professional competence that, in turn, tends to
be measured in terms of "wins," i.e., "heavy" convictions and
sentences.47  Of course, not all prosecutors serve only briefly en route
to the private sector. But those who seek careers in prosecution may
feel even greater pressure to conform to conviction-oriented values than
those who are just "passing through.' '48 Felkenes describes the pros-
ecutor's moral evolution:
"stern law enforcement." Police have the special power to criticize and "punish" prosecutors.
J. EiSENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 17, at 54.
43. See generally Kuh, Careers in Prosecution Offices, 14 J. LEGAL EDUC. 175 (1961); L.
CARTER, supra note 36, at 45. But see infra note 92.
44. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
COURTS 74 (1967) ("The high proportion of lawyers who become prosecutors without any prior
experience in the criminal process creates a need for programs to train prosecutors. This need has
long been neglected .. . . An assistant prosecutor in a typical city office learns by doing.") Id.
Apparently the situation has not changed in the years since the Commission's work. See L.
CARTER, supra note 36, at 137-38; Douglass, Continuing the Education of the Prosecutor, in
SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN PROSECUTION, 59-76 (1977); J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 17, at
116, 148 (1977) (Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit District Attorneys' offices all lack formal train-
ing programs for new assistants); In the Matter of the Discipline of An Attorney, 2 MASS. Ar'Y.
DISCIPLINE REP. 110 (1980) (prosecutor disciplined for forensic misconduct in 1976 had received
no training in prosecutorial duties). A recent flagrant example appears in McCleskey v. Kemp,
107 S. Ct. 1756, 1801 (i987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3199 (1987).
In McCleskey, the district attorney of Fulton County, Alabama testified that during his 18 years in
office, "there were no guidelines informing the Assistant District Attorneys . . .how they should
proceed. ... Id. Apparently, the only guidance given was "on-the-job training," even with
respect to discretion in seeking the death penalty. Id.
45. See, e.g., Morrison, Defending the Government: How Vigorous is Too Vigorous, in
VERDICTS ON LAWYERS, 231, 242, 249 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976) ("[T]here is no attempt
to instruct the new [assistant U.S.] attorneys about the meaning of their role or the scope of their
responsibilities under law . . . . [T]raining aids focus primarily on the how-to-do-it kinds of
questions.").
46. See infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
47. Felkenes, supra note 3, at 108-09, 114.
48. Id. at 118. See also Alschuler, supra note 16, at 111; McIntyre, Impediments to Effec-
tive Police Prosecutor Relationships, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 226 (1975) (career prosecutors
Vol. 15:197 (1988)
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On the one hand he must be the aggressive state's advocate
demanding strict compliance with state law, while on the other
hand he is the quasi-judicial officer of the court seeking justice
even for those he would prosecute. Wrestling with this
perspective of himself creates an ambivalence .... He is torn
between his image as a powerful, callous attorney and a
crusader for justice .... The anomie resulting from his con-
flict may cause the prosecutor to ignore his quasi-judicial role,
or he may play this role only in making the initial decision to
charge. If he is forced to choose only one of the roles, it is
likely that he will choose the advocate role because . . . the
criterion by which his efficiency is judged is quite likely to be
his conviction record.
49
A prosecutor's advancement might not literally depend on the
number of "win" notches in her belt, 50 but Felkenes' assertion reflects
a greater truth: prosecution agencies might not actually reward the
overzealous mentality, but still subtly discourage more than minimal
concern for competing values. Unless it results in reversal of the con-
viction, or public scandal, the prosecutor's choice to act "overzeal-
ously" can be cost-free. On the other hand, choosing a different path-
for example, dismissing a case which the police want prosecuted-
might "make waves."' s The moral and political climate in an agency
can foster a "conviction psychology" more powerfully than can any
specific policy basing promotions on an assistant's conviction rate.
are more concerned with gaining the approval of law enforcement officials than of their less com-
mitted professional colleagues); Rabinowitz, supra note 5, at 232 (junior prosecutors "just passing
through" and those so high in the agency hierarchy as to be "above the battle" are the only ones
committed to justice). But see M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 119 (1978) ("Contrary to sug-
gestions . . . that prosecutors develop a 'mentality' that is biased toward harsh dispositions, my
data reflect . . . that prosecutors mellow over time.").
49. Felkenes, supra note 3, at 118-19.
50. In my limited experience as a prosecutor, I found that prosecutors were highly motivated
to win contested cases and to secure adequate punishment for defendants who in the prosecutor's
view deserved it. However, when I asked experienced assistants whether advancement depended
upon conviction rates, they scornfully denied it. Lief Carter reports a similar lack of concern with
conviction rates among junior deputies in the California prosecution agency he studied. L.
CARTER, supra note 36, at 41, 128-29, 132. On the other hand, in one of the three cities studied
by Eisenstein and Jacob, a former district attorney reportedly kept tabs on individual prosecutor's
conviction rates in jury trials. J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 17, at 116. See also Note,
supra note 19, at 1103 n.49 (conviction rates viewed as key factor in election of prosecutors).
51. See Matthews & Marshall, Some Constraints on Ethical Behavior in Criminal Justice
Organizations, in THE SOCIAL BASIS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ETHICAL ISSUES FOR THE 80's 9-14 (F.
Schmalleger & R. Gustafson eds. 1981). "[E]thical behavior in criminal justice organizations
involves risk to the individual and to his organization." Id. at 12. The risk is loss of "effi-
ciency" (serving organizational needs) in order to gain "effectiveness" (client service). Id. at
13. "[R]isk taking in organizational role performance tends to be rare, especially in cages where
the individual has a 'no-risk' alternative available." Id. at 12-13.
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B. The Adversary System
The adversary system itself creates strong pressures on the pros-
ecutor to invest her energies single-mindedly in maximizing convictions
and punishments. These pressures are largely legitimate.5 2 However,
they can lead prosecutors to behave overzealously, using improper
means to gain a conviction or ignoring evidence of innocence or mitiga-
tion. This is so for several reasons.
First, like other players in the criminal justice system, prosecutors
are strongly motivated to achieve "substantive justice"-i.e., where
prescribed punishments are meted out to the factually guilty according
to their guilt.5 3 The more vividly the prosecutor experiences the
"justice" of punishing a particular defendant, the more compelling her
desire to justify the means necessary to this end.5 4 Similarly, the less
keenly she experiences the "injustice" that her conduct might be in-
flicting on the defendant, the less difficulty she will have in pursuing
conviction single-mindedly. The adversary system inherently tends to
bias the prosecutor against the procedural aspect of justice and in favor
of its substantive aspect. In her daily routine she is constantly exposed
to victims, police officers, civilian witnesses, probation officers and
others who can graphically establish that the defendant deserves punish-
ment, and who have no reason to be concerned with competing values
of justice. At the same time, the prosecutor is normally isolated from
those-the defendant, his family and friends, and often, his witnesses-
who might arouse the prosecutor's empathy or stimulate concern for
treating him fairly.55 A system which denies the prosecutor access to
52. See infra text accompanying notes 128-135.
53. M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT, 24, 25, 70-76 (1979). Defense counsel,
by contrast, are professionally obliged to help clients escape the punishment they deserve. Their
primary devotion in such cases is to procedural justice. See Mitchell, supra note 23, at 296-99.
54. Skolnick, Deception by Police, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 40, 41-42 (Summer/Fall 1982);
Younger, The Perjury Routine, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 551 (1967).
55. The dynamics can change radically when the defendant appears pro se. One of our most
"hard nosed" student prosecutors recently found himself plea-bargaining with a pro se defendant
who, if convicted, would lose his driver's license and, therefore, his job. The once-faceless
"defendant" was suddenly transformed into a sympathetic young man struggling to keep his new
brick-laying job. In the student's words:
I found myself almost as his advocate-trying to gain permission [from my supervisor]
to recommend a non-loss of license sentence . . . . My personal credibility [with the
judge] was on the line but I felt it was more important to ... keep this defendant work-
ing . . . . I was basically soft with the defendant because I had a triple role of D.A.,
defense counsel and advisor/middleman.
See supra note 25. A 1969 study showed that pro se defendants in the Boston lower courts
received more lenient dispositions than others. S. BING & S. ROSENFELD. THE QUALITY OF
JUSTICE IN THE LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS OF METROPOLITAN BOSTON, 51-55 (1970).
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the defendant in this way is not structured to foster the prosecutor's
devotion to "impartial justice."
Second, the prosecutor, having no individual client, 56 naturally
tends to treat victims and police officers as clients or, at least, as
spokespersons for the "public interest.' ' sT The adversary system
fosters this tendency, both emotionally and structurally. Representing
the defendant's "side," defense counsel typically tries to attack the
state's witnesses and prevent punishment of the defendant. The victim,
police and other state witnesses turn to the prosecutor for substantive
justice. Self-restraint for the sake of fairness not only requires the pros-
ecutor to resist her own desire for punishment of the defendant; she
may also face uncomprehending resistance by the victim and/or police.
Not surprisingly, prosecutors can quickly come to feel like gladiatorial
champions battling on behalf of a "team" whose members extend
beyond the victim 58 and police officers involved in the particular case to
encompass the entire law enforcement subculture.
59
This subculture includes members at all levels of various court-
house constituencies: prosecution (from peers and superiors to clerks
and secretaries), police, probation, court officers, newspaper reporters
56. See infra text accompanying notes 116-119.
57. McIntyre, supra note 48, at 219. McIntyre reports on a 1973 survey of prosecutors in
which seventeen percent "strongly agreed" and twenty-eight percent "slightly agreed" that pro-
secutors and victims are in an attorney-client relationship. But see L. CARTER, supra note 36, at
67 (except for "crime control" oriented prosecutors, most deputies "felt they really had no client
and did not think of themselves at all seriously as lawyers 'for the people' ").
58. Pressure on the prosecutor might vary according to whether the victim or officer has
influence in this network. A student prosecutor, tempted to dismiss a bad check charge initiated
by an unsavory landlord against his former tenant, was intimidated when she saw that the com-
plainant was "on a hugging basis with the court clerk."
59. Sociological studies of the police have described a "police culture." Skolnick, A Sketch
of the Policeman's "Working Personality," passim, in JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 42-70 (1966).
See also Reiss & Bordua, Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police, in THE
POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 25-55 (1967); J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR
48-49 (1970). Writers on police-prosecutor relationships have emphasized the tensions between
police and prosecutors, stemming from different organizational and career orientations. See McIn-
tyre, supra note 48, passim. No writer has focused much on the common bonds between police
and prosecutors, or on the extent to which career prosecutors share the "police culture." But see
L. CARTER, supra note 36, at 78-84.
My own experience suggests that career prosecutors, like police officers, experience social
and professional isolation, and may share other characteristics that the literature identifies as
typical of the police. These latter characteristics include political conservatism (Skolnick, supra,
at 94-95), a defensive attitude toward "outsiders" and "critics" (A. BLUMBERG, supra note 39, at
83), and a common "office view" of defense attorneys, judges and defendants (J. EISENSTEIN &
H. JACOB, supra note 17, at 149-50). See D. NiSSMAN & E: HAGEN, supra note 23, at xi: "The
nature of the prosecutor's function . . . tends to isolate him from the rest of the profession and to
unite him with his fellow prosecutors." Some prosecutors in my office would not go to restaurants
in the Italian section of the city. I felt they had something in common with my police lieutenant
friend who, at any restaurant, would only sit facing the door.
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and even sympathetic judges. 60 A prosecutor leaving the courtroom
after winning a guilty verdict or stiff sentence in an important case will
likely receive warm congratulations from members of this network.
6'
One who dismisses charges against a factually guilty defendant because
of insufficient evidence or some other imperative of justice will encoun-
ter, at best, condolences for her "loss." Such "losses," like "wins,"
are more than personal to the prosecutor; they are experienced as losses
to society.
62
Third, the super-adversary posture of the criminal defense attorney
contributes significantly to the prosecutor's perception of her own pri-
mary role as combatant. The adversary system normally creates psy-
chological pressure on attorneys for both sides to "win" even if that
requires bending, or perhaps breaking, rules that obstruct "justice" (as
each partisan sees it). But the pressure on prosecutors to engage in
such "zeal at the margins" 63 is particularly intense because of the
defense attorney's special prerogative to engage in truth-defeating (and
therefore, justice-defeating) tactics. 64 That prerogative operates on two
levels. On the first, the defendant enjoys constitutional protections,
such as the privilege against self-incrimination, which inhibit the search
for truth. 65 These protections obstruct conviction of the guilty, but are
easily justified .66
On the second level, we give defense lawyers a special license to
use truth-defeating trial tactics, justified by the severity of criminal
60. J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 17, at 22, 43-53.
61. Robert Thurber's film, Plea Bargaining: An American Way of Justice, (Thurber Pro-
ductions, Inc. 1980) contains such a congratulatory scene following conviction and imposition of
a 30-year sentence on a cruel multiple offender.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
63. D. LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83, 89 (D. Luban ed.
1983).
64. J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 17, at 149-50; Dershowitz, supra note 5, at x-xi;
Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 543, 549-50. Of course,
defense attorneys are barred from engaging in other conduct, such as making false statements to
the court or presenting perjured witnesses. See MODEL CODE, supra note 29, passim.
65. Also, in some situations the ban on counsel's knowingly presenting false testimony might
conflict with the defendant's right to testify or to the effective assistance of counsel. See Lowery
-v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730-32 (9th Cir. 1978); U.S. ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d
115, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1977). But see Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 997 (1986) (right to
assistance of counsel not violated by attorney who refused to cooperate in presenting perjured
testimony). According to some, the defendant's due process rights would justify a criminal (but
not civil) defendant's lawyer in hiring an actress to pose before the jury as the defendant's con-
cerned grandmother. Austern, Ethics, 21 TRIAL No. 8 at 14 (Aug. 1985).
66. Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of American Criminal Procedure: The Warren
and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 201-02 (1983); Goldstein, The State





sanctions and the usual imbalance of resources between the defendant
and the state. These tactics include cross-examination to discredit a
witness known to be telling the truth, exploitation of opposing party
evidence known to be false, and failure to disclose or introduce
material, adverse evidence. 67 Even scholars who question the morality
of lawyers generally engaging in this sort of legitimate, but harmful,
conduct on behalf of clients justify it with regard to the criminal defense
bar. 68 But the prosecutor, enjoined to "fight fairly," is barred from
using the same tactics. From her point of view, she is sent into battle
with a blunted sword, while her opponent's is sharpened to a razor's
edge. 6
9
67. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 550; Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical
Research Program for Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REv. 451, 458 (1981) (the "false defense" hypo-
thetical); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 6, 12
(1975).
68. This so-called "criminal case exception" draws general approval. D. LUBAN, supra
note 63, at 83, 91-93; Schwartz, supra note 64, at 551-52. But see Ball, Wrong Experiment,
Wrong Result: An Appreciatively Critical Response to Schwartz, 1983 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J.
565, 571 and Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis.
L. REv. 1529, 1540 criticizing the view that criminal defense attorneys are morally less account-
able for such tactics than civil practitioners. For a different view of the "exception," see
Schneyer, id., at 1544-45 (describing zealousness rules as a corrective for cooperative reality, par-
ticularly in criminal defense work).
69. See Civiletti, Prosecutor as Advocate, 25 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1, 17-19 (1979) (dis-
cussing limitations on prosecutors). Compare STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 3-4.1(c) (unpro-
fessional for prosecutor knowingly to make false statement or representation in course of pleas
discussion with the defense) with STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 4-6.2(b) (defense counsel may
not "knowingly make false statements concerning the evidence" during plea negotiations with the
prosecution). The different wording implies recognition of greater freedom for defense counsel to
lie in negotiations. The commentary to the STANDARDS does not indicate whether that was the
drafter's intention.
Furthermore, prosecutors perceive that many defense lawyers enjoy another "special advan-
tage" by engaging in blatantly unethical practices such as presenting perjured testimony (see L.
CARTER, supra note 36, at 87-88 (filing motions designed to delay the proceedings); Alschuler,
supra note 16, passim) and engaging in impermissible trial examinations and argument. The
defendant's sole right to appeal the verdict insulates questionable defense tactics from appellate
review and may give trial judges an incentive to favor the defense in evidentiary disputes. Van
den Haag, Limiting Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 15 CuMB. L. REv. 1, 9
(1984). For some, prosecutorial "overzalousness," and even "benign" police perjury, might be
justified as "fighting fire with fire." Skolnick, supra note 54, at 42-43. But see United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1985) (disapproving this practice of "fighting fire with fire"). Some
prosecutors similarly justify the common judicial bias in their favor.
This asymmetry between the prosecution and defense roles at trial has led Murray Schwartz
to argue that criminal proceedings are not truly "adversary." Schwartz, supra note 64, at 548-50.
According to Schwartz, adversary proceedings postulate that the opposing lawyers "be roughly
equal in their dedication to the cause of their principals and in their opposition to the cause of their
opponents," and that counsel for both parties have roughly equal competence to perform their pro-
fessional functions. Id. at 547. However, prosecutors are hampered procedurally from discovering
the truth, and defense lawyers do not pursue that goal. As I shall argue (see infra text accompany-
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C. Our System for Enforcing Professional Responsibility
The prosecutor's duties to act fairly and protect defendants' rights
are articulated in a variety of forms, including binding disciplinary
rules, 70 recommended standards of behavior,7' court opinions72 and bar
disciplinary body rulings. 73 With few exceptions, the rules and stan-
dards are framed so broadly that they offer prosecutors little concrete
guidance. 74 Questions about the propriety of particular behavior could
be answered by internal administrative procedures,"7 published bar
association advisory opinions, or judicial disciplinary opinions. But
these mechanisms seldom operate to clarify the prosecutor's conflicting
obligations.
76
Rather, the limits on prosecutorial zealousness are most commonly
formulated by courts responding to claims by convicted defendants that
the prosecutor's "misconduct" violated due process. 77 The ultimate
test in such cases is not the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct, but
the "fundamental fairness" of defendant's trial. 78  Because courts are
understandably reluctant to reverse convictions, even if the prosecutor's
conduct has been egregiously unethical, deciding questions of pros-
ecutorial misconduct in the appellate context discourages a balanced
consideration of the issues. Especially when the defendant's factual
guilt seems clear, courts in these cases may strain to excuse 79 or over-
look the prosecutor's questionable conduct. And even if the conduct is
ing notes 132-135), I think the prosecutor's function is usefully viewed as adversarial. But even
if Schwartz was correct in theory, criminal prosecutions occur within the adversary system, are
adversary in form, and are staffed by lawyers educated to function as adversaries. Naturally, then,
adversary norms and forms must heavily influence prosecutorial behavior.
70. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at DR 7-103(b); MODEL RULES supra note 1, at
§ 3.8(d) (duty to disclose exclupatory evidence to the defense).
71. See, e.g., NATIONAL DISTRIcT ATTORNEYs ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STAN-
DARDS ch. 7 (1977).
72. See, e.g., cases collected in Annot. supra note 4.
73. See, e.g., LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT (1984).
74. For example, the scope of the prosecutor's duty under MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at
DR 7-103(B) to disclose "evidence ... that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the
degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment .... " is unclear. A substantial body of case law
and scholarship has explored the meaning of the analagous constitutional duty under the due proc-
ess clause. See Rosen, supra note 19, at 733 n.144.
75. For example, training sessions, written guidelines or case supervision.
76. See Steele, supra note 2, at 976 (paucity of disciplinary proceedings); infra, text accom-
panying notes 233-35 (internal agency guidelines are rare and ineffective).
77. Steele, supra note 2, at 976-77.
78. Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2472-73 (1986).
79. Appellate treatment of prosecutorial comment at trial on the defendant's failure to testify
is an example. See Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin




declared constitutionally improper, the conviction will stand so long as
the error was "harmless."
80
Language in appellate opinions condemning prosecutorial miscon-
duct may influence prosecutors less than the bottom line endorsement,
"conviction affirmed." This is especially true because appellate opin-
ions typically refrain from identifying prosecutors whose conduct they
condemn, 81 and the courts rarely refer such incidents to local bar
association disciplinary bodies.
82
This pattern of response to alleged misconduct tempts prosecutors
to equate the relevant professional responsibility requirements with the
constitutional standards developed in the appellate case law. Thus the
duty to "do justice" comes to be defined in terms of minimal due proc-
ess, and proper prosecutorial conduct in terms of conduct consistent
with a constitutionally fair trial. 83 Given the absence of effective
forums outside the criminal process for interpreting and enforcing
norms of prosecutorial ethics, this tendency seems likely to continue.
D. Conclusion
The preceding discussion suggests first, that prosecutorial "over-
zealousness" is widespread; and second, that it stems from various fac-
tors, including the essentially conflicting dual roles assigned to pros-
ecutors, the vagueness of the injunction to "do justice," and a host of
institutional pressures to pursue high conviction rates. The first propo-
sition might be attacked (1) because it misrepresents the predominant
climate of prosecution agencies, or (2) because it assumes some com-
mon understanding of "overzealousness'" that does not, and perhaps
80. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
81. This is so even when courts reverse convictions because of prosecutorial misconduct.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 907, 914, 444 N.E.2d 374, 380, 383 (1983)
(Abrams, J., concurring).
82. But see United States v. Kelly, 543 F. Supp. 1303, 1311 (D. Mass. 1982), 550 F. Supp.
901, 902 (D. Mass. 1982) (reviewing findings of a board of bar overseers). Some bar disciplinary
bodies now screen appellate opinions for instances of misconduct on their own initiative.
83. For example, almost every case and commentary regarding the prosecutor's duty to
disclose "exculpatory" evidence concerns the legal and constitutional requirements. Almost no
attention has been given to the appropriateness of independently construing the prosecutor's ethical
duty to disclose (MODEL CODE, supra note 29, DR 7-103(B)). See Rabinowitz, supra note 5, at
233 (Brady rule "would be quite unnecessary if the prosecutor were genuinely interested in
justice."). Perhaps more attention will be given to the prosecutor's ethical duty now that the
Supreme Court has virtually emasculated the disclosure standards under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-114 (1976); United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 695-703 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Rosen, supra note 17,
at 697 (national survey of bar disciplinary bodies discloses negligible number of disciplinary pro-
ceedings, and fewer stiff sanctions, for failure to disclose).
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cannot, exist. While I think the first objection has merit, I agree only
partly with the second.
The charge of rampant overzealousness is probably overstated.
Some observers of prosecution agencies do describe "conviction psy-
chology" as the norm,8 4 while others paint a different picture. For
example, in her study of discretion and negotiation in two California
court systems, Pamela Utz describes two competing models of prosecu-
tion: the "adversary" and the "magisterial." 8 5 And Lief Carter sug-
gests that the zealous "crime fighter" type is dysfunctional and a
potential embarrassment to the office.8 6 The sparse data at hand 7 do
not support generalizations about how the "typical" American pros-
ecutor views her role, but we know that many resist the pressures we
have described. 8
Contrasting prosecutorial styles coexist, often within a single agen-
cy. 89 As in other practice contexts, each person chooses the kind of
prosecutor he or she wants to be. The choice is probably influenced by
many factors, including one's background, personality, education,
training, and work environment. 90 We should, therefore, regard pros-
ecutors as heterogeneous and malleable individuals, not as a mass of
zealots.
Among the likely factors influencing a prosecutor to take seriously
her duty to "seek justice," two stand out. First, there is the message
communicated by the professional codes and standards, reinforced
(however inadequately) by academic, judicial and professional sources.
While some prosecutors treat the message merely as superficial
ideology, masking their "real" goals of maximizing convictions, 9t
others do not. Second, the relative brevity of most prosecutors'
careers92 makes them vulnerable to counter-pressures from outside the
84. A. BLUMBERG, supra note 39, at 131-37; Felkenes, supra note 3, at 108-09;
Rabinowitz, supra note 5, at 231 passim.
85. Utz, Two Models of Prosecutorial Professionalism, in THE PROSECUTOR 99 passim (W.
McDonald ed. 1979).
86. L. CARTER, supra note 36, at 68.
87. See supra note 34.
88. See, e.g., Felkenes, supra note 3, at 109-10 (majority of prosecutors surveyed expressed
concern for fairness and impartiality).
89. Id.
90. See Jacoby, The Charging Policies of Prosecutors, in THE PROSECUTOR 75, 77-8 (W.
McDonald ed. 1979); Utz, supra note 85, at 114-19.
91. A. BLUMBERO, supra note 39, at 123.
92. An informal survey in 1975 reported the average tenure of assistant prosecutors as less
than two years. McIntyre, supra note 48, at 225 n.34. In recent years, however, prosecution
agencies have been attracting better qualified, more career-oriented recruits. See P. WICE, CHAOS




agency. Those who wish to move on to private practice or the bench
have an incentive to impress defense lawyers and judges with their
ability to be "fair" and "reasonable.
' 93
The second objection to my suggestion that overzealousness is
widespread is that "overzealousness" (in the broad attitudinal sense,
and not as manifested in objectively defined misconduct)94 is essentially
a pejorative label for legitimate prosecutorial conduct disliked by the
speaker. According to this view, the prosecutor's dual role is not to be
taken seriously. Society's insistence that prosecutors "seek justice" is
only rhetorical window dressing: we really want them to speak like the
Pope and act like Rambo. 95 I think this view is wrong, but I suspect it
has widespread appeal, partly because it contains a large kernel of
truth: we express the duty in such vague platitudes as to suggest it
lacks any substantive content. In response to this view, I attempt to
articulate the meaning and practical importance of the prosecutor's
"quasi-judicial" duty in the next two parts.96
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S QUASI-JUDICIAL ROLE: CURRENT EXPLANATIONS
The student prosecutor in the Vietnam Veteran case questioned her
responsibility to "seek justice." The traditional response would lead to
a consideration of prosecutorial function. Observers have described
three major functions: "administrative," "quasi-judicial" and "adver-
sary." ' 97 The prosecutor's "administrative" function, 98 which encom-
man, The Social and Occupational Mobility of Prosecutors: New York City, in THE PROSECUTOR
239, 253 (,V. McDonald ed. 1979). It is hard to predict whether or how this trend will change
the prosecution climate.
93. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 111.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 4-17.
95. Of course, "we" believe this only when the defendants are "them" and not "us."
96. Exploring this duty is worthwhile for other reasons. A deeper understanding of the
prosecutor's proper role would expose claims of "overzealousness" that are based upon extrava-
gant notions of the prosecutor's duty to "justice." Also, prosecutors who now succumb to a
"conviction psychology" might not do so if they were offered a coherent alternative understanding
of their role.
97. According to the STANDARDS, supra note 1 at § 3-1.1 comment, the prosecutor serves in
three capacities: counsel for the prosecution, "minister of justice" and "administrator of
justice." Albert Alschuler refers to these as "advocate." "minister of justice" and "adminis-
trator." Alschuler, supra note 16, at 52-53. LaFave describes four functions: trial counsel for
the police, house counsel for the police, representative of the court and mirror of community opin-
ion. W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 515 (1980).
Blumberg lists five major prosecution functions: collection agent, dispenser of justice, power
broker-fixer, political enforcer and overseer of the police. A. BLUMBERG, supra note 39, at 133.
See also J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY XV (1980) (four prin-
cipal functions); Steele, supra note 2, at 965 (three major functions). Of course, some of these
described functions are extrinsic to criminal prosecution.
98. Steele calls this the "processing" function. Steele, supra note 2, at 965.
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passes her obligation to the court and society to avoid unnecessary
delays and backlogs, 99 is essentially instrumental. As an administrator
the prosecutor manages limited resources so as to maximize the primary
interests that criminal prosecutors ought to promote. These are ex-
pressed in terms of a dual role: to perform both as "zealous advocate"
for the state and as a "quasi-judicial" officer ("minister of justice"). 00
These terms, however, are by no means self-explanatory. The
prosecutor's duty of "zealous advocacy" may seem readily understand-
able. But what do these courts, commentators and drafters of profes-
sional codes of conduct mean by "quasi-judicial" and "minister of
justice"? Although nowhere explicitly defined, the prosecutor's quasi-
judicial function connotes both a procedural orientation (the quasi-
judicial role) and a set of objectives (the quasi-judicial values), each of
which is defined in contrast to an "adversary" counterpart. Pro-
cedurally, in her quasi-judicial role the prosecutor acts "impartially"
and judge-like; her orientation to the factual contest is neutral. This is
usually contrasted to the prosecutor's adversary role, in which she func-
tions as an advocate for the state and against the defendant.
In her quasi-judicial role the prosecutor owes allegiance to a broad
set of societal values because she is bound to seek the truth and to
"guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the
public." 10 1 But as zealous advocate she is seen as devoted to a much
99. According to Alschuler, as an administrator the prosecutor's goal is to "dispose of each
case in the fastest, most efficient manner in the interest of getting [her] and the court's work
done." Alschuler, supra note 16, at 52. See also Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary
System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 52, 55 (1967) (describing prosecutor role as "calendar
man"). The administrative task might also include efficient use of law enforcement and correc-
tional resources, for example, disposing of cases so as to minimize jail overcrowding or police
overtime costs. The STANDARDS include among the prosecutor's functions as an "administrator of
justice" shaping the "character, quality and efficiency" of the criminal justice system. STAN.
DARDS, supra note 1, at § 3-1.1 comment.
100. For example, the MODEL RULES, declare: "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate." MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.8
comment. See also MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at EC 7-13 ("The responsibility of a public
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to con-
vict"); STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 3-1.1(c) (same language as the MODEL CODE). The
judicial origin of prosecution in the United States supports the "quasi-judicial" terminology. See
Goldstein, History of the Public Prosecutor, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1286-90
(S. Kadish ed. 1983); J. JACOBY, supra note 97, at 19. Henceforth I shall use "quasi-judicial"
and "minister of justice" synonymously.
101. STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 3-1.1 comment. Compare this with Alschuler's defini-
tion of the "quasi-judicial" role as trying "to do the right thing for the defendant in view of the
defendant's social circumstances or in view of the peculiar circumstances of his crime."
Alschuler, supra note 16, at 53. In the prosecutorial immunity context, courts use "quasi-
judicial" differently to refer to the functions of initiating and presenting cases-as opposed to
investigative and administrative functions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20, 424
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narrower range of interests and values. For example, according to
Albert Alschuler, the prosecutor tries as an advocate to "maximize both
the number of convictions and the severity of the sentences that are
imposed after conviction. ' ' 10 2 The conventional opposition, then, is
between loyalty to "fairness and justice" and to maximizing penal
severity.




QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION ADVERSARY FUNCTION
A. Role:
Impartial, judge-like Zealous, adverse
neutrality advocacy
B. Values/Objectives:
Justice, truth, fairness, Convictions,
rights of accused penal severity
This dual role conception poses two basic problems. First, how
should prosecutors understand the values of "fairness" and "justice"
that as quasi-judicial officers they are bound to promote? Second, what
is the relative scope of the quasi-judicial and adversary roles? Do pros-
ecutors serve in both simultaneously? Or, does each role apply only to
the performance of certain tasks? If the latter, how can the prosecutor
know which role is appropriate to a particular task? I shall first
describe the traditional view of both the nature of quasi-judicial values
and the scope of the prosecutor's two roles. I shall then propose a more
detailed model for understanding the prosecutor's dual role.
(1976) (prosecutors referred to as "quasi-judicial" officers because they exercise discretionary
judgment in deciding which suits to pursue and how to conduct them in court).
102. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 52.
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A. Quasi-Judicial Values
What does it mean for a prosecutor to seek "justice"? What value
is she supposed to promote? The existing sources give scant guidance.
The duty to "seek justice" might be construed in a positivist sense,
as merely enjoining prosecutors from violating independently articu-
lated restrictions (whether substantive or procedural) on prosecutorial
power. The message would be that while performing as an advocate,
one should not violate specific ethical prohibitions, court rules, statutes,
or the defendant's constitutional rights. In this view, the ethical com-
mand has no independent content.
Neither the codes of professional responsibility nor the cases
contradict this view. Although the relevant American Bar Associa-
tion Standards specify the duty to seek justice,103 the codes of pro-
fessional responsibility include it in hortative ethical considerations
and commentary rather than in binding disciplinary rules. 104 Nor
have courts reversed convictions or disciplined prosecutors for violating
the duty to "seek justice" per se.10 5 Although courts frequently
condemn prosecutors for disregarding their quasi-judicial role, most if
not all successful claims of prosecutorial misconduct rest upon viola-
tion of other, more specifically defined duties.1 06 Even the two sources
usually cited as authority for the duty to "seek justice"-Justice
Sutherland's 1935 opinion in Berger v. United States,10 7 and a 1940
103. STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 3-1.1(c).
104. MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at EC 7-12; MODEL RuLES, supra note 1, at Rule 3.8
comment.
105. For an overview of misconduct triggering appellate reversals see Gershman, supra note
5, passim. Regarding the misconduct that has triggered disciplinary sanctions see Annot. supra
note 4.
106. See, e.g., Boatwright v. State, 452 So.2d 666, 667-68 (4th Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Peterson v. State, 376 So.2d 1230, 1234-35 (4th Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Commonwealth v.
Mahdi, 448 N.E.2d 704, 712-13 (Mass. 1983); Commonwealth v. Smith, 444 N.E.2d 374,
378-79, 382 (Mass. 1983); State v. Long, 684 S.W.2d 361, 364-66 (Mo. App. 1984); Collier v.
State, 705 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Nev. 1985); People v. Monroe, 480 N.Y.S.2d 259, 267-68 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1984); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 455 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Pa. 1983); State v. Kanney,
289 S.E.2d 485, 486-87 (W. Va. 1982); State v. Critzer, 280 S.E.2d 288, 289-92 (W. Va. 1981).
But see United States v. Bourg, 598 F.2d 445, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing for "unfair"
prosecutorial conduct at trial, without specifying particular violations of law or code of profes-
sional ethics); Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1470, 1477-78 (11th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., concur-
ring) (advocating reversal for prosecutor's violation of "fair play" by taking inconsistent positions
in successive trials).
107. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935):
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controver-
sy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
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speech 08 by Justice Jackson-ascribe no independent content to the
duty. The prosecutor in Berger was guilty of various forensic misdeeds
that would have been sanctionable if done by any attorney. These in-
cluded, for example, misstating the facts in cross-examination and argu-
ing his personal knowledge to the jury. 10 9 And Justice Jackson's
speech attacked selective prosecutions o that would have violated the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Neither Justice Jackson in
his speech, nor the Berger Court in its opinion, addressed the duty to
seek "justice" per se at all.
But the duty to "seek justice" implies a normative conception of
the prosecutor's duty according to which "justice" has some indepen-
dent meaning. Even if this duty is not enforceable as such, it need not
be entirely meaningless. Its very prominence in the professional
rhetoric suggests that it says something meaningful to prosecutors, at
least about how to apply other, more specific norms. But what is that
"something"?
Traditional definitions of the prosecutor's role side-step the ques-
tion by focusing upon virtue rather than values."' Thus, to Justice
Jackson "[tihe qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as
impossible to define as those which mark a gentleman. And those who'
need to be told would not understand it anyway .... ,,12 In the land-
mark case, Attorney General v. Tufts, the Massachusetts high court
commented on the vast powers enjoyed by district attorneys:
Powers so great impose responsibilities correspondingly
grave. They demand character incorruptible, reputation un-
sullied, a high standard of professional ethics, and sound judg-
ment of no mean order .... The office ... is to be held and
administered wholly in the interests of the people at large and
with an eye single to their welfare.'
13
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
108. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. OF JUDICATURE SOC. 18 (1940) (speech
delivered by Attorney General Robert H. Jackson at the second annual conference of the United
States Attorneys in Washington, D.C., April 1, 1940).
109. Berger, 295 U.S. at 84-87.
110. "[T]he real crime [is] that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group,
being attached to the wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the
prosecutor himself." Jackson, supra note 108, at 19.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 173-74.
112. Jackson, supra note 108, at 20.
113. Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 489, 132 N.E. 322, 326 (1921). See also
Civiletti, supra note 69, at 2 ("[i]n the end self-governance is the essential constraint" on prosecu-
torial misconduct).
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In sum, the traditional discussion of quasi-judicial values begins with
broad platitudes and ends with an idealized notion of the prosecutor's
character.
B. The Relation Between Quasi-Judicial and Adversary Roles
The sources are somewhat more helpful regarding the scope of the
prosecutor's dual roles than their content. Some commentators have
suggested that the quasi-judicial role applies only to certain pros-
ecutorial tasks. There are two leading models that take this view. The
first focuses on the prosecutor's role as "surrogate client" on behalf of
the public; 114 the second upon her tasks at particular stages of the
criminal process. 115 In my view, neither model succeeds in confining
the prosecutor's quasi-judicial role within neat boundaries; this role per-
vades prosecutorial work. But each model helps to illuminate the pros-
ecutorial function in relation to the adversary system.
1. The Prosecutor as Surrogate Client-The prosecutor's role is
markedly different from that of the lawyer for an individual client. The
latter's task is to promote the client's lawful interest as the client defines
it. The lawyer is obliged to pursue that goal zealously, subject to con-
straints such as legal rules, rules of professional responsibility, the
lawyer's own moral principles, 11 6 and the availability of time, money
and other resources. In many practical contexts, we know that the prin-
ciple of client autonomy and control is seriously compromised. 1 7 Even
so, the client does participate, however formally, in making or endors-
ing key decisions. But no individual client exists to tell prosecutors
which interests to pursue in any given case. One might therefore view
the prosecutor as "a lawyer with no client but with several important
constituencies" such as the police, victims and the media.1 8 Alter-
natively, she might be seen as serving in a dual capacity-as surrogate
for her incorporeal public client and as lawyer.119
114. See infra text accompanying notes 119-21.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 128-30.
116. Whether this constraint should operate, and to what extent, has been much debated. See,
e.g., Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 63, 64 (1980);
Schneyer, supra note 68, at 1529.
117. D. RosENmAL, LAWYER AND CUENT: WHo's IN CHARGE? 143 (1974); Basten, Control
and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 6 J. LEGAL PROF. 7 passim (1981); Menkel-Meadow, The
Transformatioi of Disputes by Lawyers, 1985 J. Disp. RrsOL. 25, 32-34; Spiegel, Lawyering and
Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 41, 49,
64-65 (1979).
118. C. NVOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Ermcs § 13.10, at 759 (1986); Attorney General v.
Tufts Univ., 239 Mass. 458, 489, 132 N.E. 322, 326 (1921).
119. The MODEL CODE, uses this analogy. MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at EC 7-13 ("[r]he
Vol. IS: 197 (1988)
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According to the latter view, the prosecutor resembles the lawyer
for the incompetent client who has no legal representative. First, she
must place herself in the client's shoes and decide what the client's
interest demands; then she must use her legal skills to promote that
interest.120  If the incompetent client were a tort victim, the lawyer
would need to decide whether to sue the tortfeasor and for what relief,
whether to settle or go to trial, whether to appeal, and so forth. A pros-
ecutor analogously decides whether to prosecute, for what crime, and
what punishment to seek. The decisions she makes in her "client" role
are arguably "quasi-judicial." The public at large is "impartial" and
"neutral" rather than adversary, and the public interest reflects a broad
range of values and interests including, of course, truth-seeking and
fairness. Once the prosecutor has, on behalf of her "client," made
these decisions, she dons her "lawyer" hat and zealously pursues the
goals that she has set as surrogate client. From this point on she func-
tions as an adversary and her goal is victory.
The "surrogate model" has the advantage of emphasizing the pros-
ecutor's responsibility for defining the public's interest before embark-
ing on the path of zealous advocacy. 121 In effect, her task as "client"
prosecutor is not only an advocate, but also may make decisions normally made by an individual
client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all.").
120. See MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at EC 7-12. Of course the prosecutor's decision-
making role differs significantly from the role of attorney-guardian ad litem. Guardian decisions
in the ward's "best interests" are subject to court review. 39 C.J.S. Regulation and Supervision
of Guardianship § 7 (1976); H. TAYLOR, LAW OF GuARDIAN AND WARD 103, 142 (1935).
However, prosecutors are insulated from the same review by the principle of separation of
powers. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965). Prosecutors also differ from attorney-guardians representing incompetent wards in "right
to die" litigation, where the attorney-guardian merely aids the court in discovering the incompe-
tent's putative preference (not "best interest") in the situation. Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 750-53, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428-430 (1970). See also
In the Matter of Mary Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 565-67, 432 N.E.2d 712, 720 (1982). Critics have
argued that the roles of attorney and guardian ad litem should not be performed by the same per-
son, because the "two roles constitute an inherent and unavoidable conflict of interest." Harhai,
A Comparison of the Guardian/Ward and the Attorney/Client Relationship, in NATIONAL LEGAL
RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, NATIONAL GuARDIAN AD LrrEM
PoucY CoNFERNcE MANAL 79 (rev. ed. 1981). To the extent that we assign both roles to indi-
vidual prosecutors, the same criticism has force. In practice, prosecutors probably tend to focus
their attention on their attorney role and approach their "guardian" functions unsystematically,
even casually.
121. This model also has the advantage of helping the prosecutor make some sense of the
otherwise ill-fitting professional responsibility codes, which generally assume the existence of a
single, identifiable client. By reference to that client the lawyer can identify "outside pressures"
exerted by "third party" interests. Like other lawyers, prosecutors are bound by norms of client
loyalty, zeal and confidentiality, and can encounter difficulties in each area. But first, by defini-
tion, they must identify the "client" or "client interests" at stake. See generally G. HAZARD,
ErMcs IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 43-68 (1978); Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer,
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is to make public policy in the context of particular criminal proceed-
ings. However, the model fails to guide the prosecutor in distinguish-
ing basic, policy-setting "client" choices from those that-because they
are merely "technical" or "strategic"-are for the lawyer.1 22 Even
more troubling, this model suggests that when functioning as an advo-
cate, the prosecutor can somehow define a particular litigation goal
(like "conviction" or "incarceration") in isolation from the public's
broader interest in justice. This conclusion would be mistaken.
To illustrate, suppose that in the Vietnam Veteran case,1 23 the stu-
dent prosecutor has decided to seek a guilty finding and probation. In
the course of plea discussions, she realizes that the defense counsel is
unprepared and incompetent because he seems unaware of a strong
fourth amendment suppression issue that, if pursued successfully, might
defeat the State's case. Should the prosecutor permit defense counsel to
plea bargain anyway? Or should she alert him to the issue and/or
inform the authorities of his incompetence?
124
Under the surrogate client model, the prosecutor would need first
to classify the decision facing her. Is she wearing her "client" or
"lawyer" hat? Adversary proceedings are under way, and this partic-
ular decision arises in negotiations between two lawyers-each seeking
zealously to advance his client's interest. One might reasonably con-
clude that the prosecutor is acting qua lawyer, and therefore has no
"quasi-judicial" duty to "seek justice." She need only obey the law
57 N.C.L. REv. 625, 634 (1979). Like the codes, most of the literature on professional respon-
sibility assumes the existence of an identifiable client. See, for example, the lively debate regard-
ing the "moral distance" between private and professional ("role differentiated") moralities
discussed in D. LuBAN, supra note 63, passim. As Gerald Postema points out, the ordinary
lawyer's conflict between private and professional moral obligations stems principally from his
role as agent for another person-the client. Postema, supra note 116, at 76-77.
122. This difficulty also confronts lawyers in other practice contexts. See Speigel, supra note
117, at 49-52; Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defendant
in Trial Tactics, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 636, 668-69 (1977).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
124. Prosecutors are uniquely positioned to observe incompetent and lazy representation of
defendants. Their common failure to report this behavior to the disciplinary authorities probably
rests in part on their fear of treading upoti the defendant's constitutional right to counsel, and in
part on the same factors that explain the failure of lawyers and judges generally to report lawyer
incompetence. These factors include vague standards defining competence, uncertainty about the
facts, fear of inviting counter-charges and concern that reports will dampen healthy adversariness.
Aside from touting the vague duty to improve the law and the administration of criminal justice
(STANDARDS supra note 1, at § 3-1.4), the professional codes do not give the prosecutor a special
obligation to ensure competent defense representation. Cf. THE AMERICAN LAWYER's CODE OF
CoNDucr, supra note 20, at Rule 9.9 (imposing on prosecutors a duty to advise the court prompt-
ly if they know "that a defendant is not receiving or has not received effective assistance of
counsel"); MODEL RULE, supra note 1, at Rule 8.3 (every lawyer's duty to report certain viola-
tions of the MODEL RuLEs).
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and specific rules of ethics. Accepting the plea in silence would not
violate a constitutional right or other ethical command, so she should do
so. 125
But this reasoning assumes too narrow a view of the "client" inter-
est which the prosecutor is bound to advance. Protection of the defen-
dant's right to counsel is potentially an "objective" of the public client
rather than a "strategic or tactical" decision for the lawyer.12 6 Her
plea negotiation goal is not simply to win a larceny conviction and a
probationary sentence. True, she originally defined the public interest
in those terms. But she did so by identifying and weighing a host of
relevant public interests, including an interest in promoting procedural
fairness. Once it becomes apparent that defense counsel is incompe-
tent, the prosecutor's decision whether to "help" the defendant is not
merely a question of strategic advocacy.1 27 Rather, it resurrects the
previously answered question: How should the prosecutor qua
"client" define the interest that, qua lawyer, she will represent? If she
fails to consider whether, on balance, society "prefers" to risk losing
the conviction rather than to convict someone who has not had compe-
tent counsel, then she has failed to represent her client's interest
zealously.
Whether in our hypothetical case the prosecutor should compensate
for defense counsel's apparent incompetence is unclear. What is clear
is that she should treat the question seriously because she cannot suc-
ceed as a "zealous advocate" unless she identifies her client's substan-
tive and procedural goals. Just as a defense lawyer may have to consult
his client over new developments, the prosecutor will frequently need to
reconsider her litigating posture in light of new information.
In conclusion, it is conceptually useful for prosecutors to distin-
guish their roles as "surrogate client" and "lawyer." But they cannot
insulate their adverse "lawyer" role from the broad range of competing
values appropriate to their quasi-judicial "client" role. If they do not
wear both hats simultaneously, they must at least learn to switch them
frequently and quickly.
125. As a practical matter, the prosecutor might choose to intervene for a strategic reason-to
avoid appellate reversal of conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
126. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, at Rule 1.2(a), 1.2(a) comment; MODEL CODE, supra
note 29, at EC 7-7, EC 7-8; STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 4-5.2(a),(b).
127. "In the exercise of one's professional expertise, factual judgments and value judgments
are inextricably bound together. Professionals are called upon to make difficult judgments in
which technical competence and moral values are interwoven.... T]he moral hazards of lawyer-
ing ...cannot be overcome simply by the application of technique." Elliston, Ethics, Profes-
sionalism and the Practice of Law, 16 Loy. U. Cma. L.J. 529, 533-35 (1985).
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2. The Adversary Stage Theory-The notion that the quasi-judicial
role exists in relation to particular prosecutorial tasks is reflected in
Whitney Seymour's much-cited defense of prosecutorial zealousness.1
28
Seymour argues the prosecutor's duty to "seek justice" applies prin-
cipally in the decision to prosecute and in preparing a case for the grand
jury. Deciding to prosecute is, he argues, tantamount to deciding that
prosecution "is how justice will be done." 129 Once trial approaches,
the prosecutor is a "full-fledged fighting advocate .... He must act
with candor and fairness, but he must also fight for his cause. To do
otherwise would be to violate his duty . . "130
Seymour's argument makes sense in light of the prosecutor's role
in' the adversary system. The trial is Seymour's paradigm setting.
There the prosecutor's conduct is subject to the constraints of an adver-
sary forum such as a public audience, vigorous defense counsel, a judge
acting as neutral arbiter. The prosecutor fulfills her duty by performing
as a partisan in the adversary search for truth. By contrast, her charg-
ing decisions and grand jury work are secret and lack the adversary
system's safeguards against abuse. Just as the presence of safeguards at
trial frees her to take the role of a "fighting advocate" in that setting,
so their absence before trial behooves her to act as a more neutral
seeker of justice. 131
From this argument one could draw a general principle that in
adversary contexts prosecutors should behave like zealous advocates,
but in contexts lacking adversary system safeguards they should assume
the quasi-judicial role. This perspective overlaps partially with the
"surrogate client" model. "Client" decisions are typically made in
non-adversary settings like homes and offices, and at pre-adversary
stages; "lawyer" decisions often occur in, and directly relate to, the
adversary battle.
But like the surrogate client model, the "adversary stage" theory
qulcdy breaks down. Even at trial we expect the prosecutor to rein in
her devotion to winning. For example, she has a continuing duty to
128. Seymour, Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REc. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 302, 312-13
(1956).
129. Id. at 312-13.
130. Id. See also J. JACOBY, supra note 97, at xxii ("[For the evaluation of his case the
prosecutor assumes a quasi-judicial role. Once he has decided to accept the case for prosecution,
he assumes an adversary role.").
131. Cf Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAuIF. L. REv.
669, 678 (1978). Schwartz argues that the lawyer's general duty of zealous representation applies
only in contested judicial matters; outside of litigation a lawyer is free to subordinate his client's




reveal exculpatory evidence.1 3 2 Nor should we view the prosecutor's
role at the pre-trial (or pre-charge) stages as exclusively quasi-judicial.
For example, the prosecutor's decision whether probable cause exists to
justify application for an arrest warrant may call for impartiality. But
the decision regarding what information to include in the warrant affi-
davit may require strategic advocacy. Similarly, in deciding whether
and how to investigate a potential defendant, what evidence to present
at a probable cause hearing, or which defendants to charge with what
offenses, the prosecutor should not ignore her duties as an advocate.
Both roles are likely to apply at all stages of the process. A general
principle of behavior strictly tied to predetermined stages of prosecution
may lead either to misconduct or to incompetence in the exercise of
critical prosecutorial powers.
Although the "adversary stage" theory cannot inexorably guide
prosecutors to the appropriate role orientation, it offers a valuable start-
ing point because it focuses attention on the prosecutor's role in the
adversary system. This point is apparent if we think about the student
prosecutor's dilemma in the Vietnam Veteran case. Should she have
made her sentence recommendation as a "full-fledged fighting advo-
cate" or as a "seeker of justice"? Under the former view, perhaps she
should have pressed (within reason) for maximum severity. Under the
latter, perhaps not. The defendant stood charged with larceny. Adver-
sary proceedings were under way, and the defendant was represented
by counsel. This suggests, at least on its face, that the prosecutor
should have adopted the role of zealous advocate.
The "incompetent defense counsel" hypothetical discussed
above 133 illustrates an important qualification of the adversary stage
theory. Defendant has been charged, is represented by counsel, and the
two lawyers are negotiating over the plea and disposition. Arguably,
then, an advocate's role is appropriate. On the other hand, this stage
hardly offers the safeguards of adversary trials. Plea negotiations are
secret and therefore insulated from meaningful external review.
Defense counsel has displayed a lack of vigor, if not blatant incom-
petence. The absence of effective adversary system safeguards should
surely complicate the prosecutor's choice of role and demonstrate that
her duty to promote "fairness and justice" cannot be neatly confined to
particular stages of proceedings.1 34 It should instead be viewed as a
132. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
134. Similar reasoning justifies the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense.
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general residual duty, supplanted from time to time, in the presence of
other protections, by a narrower adversary role.
135
C. Summary
I have argued thus far that: (1) the prosecutor's quasi-judicial
function connotes both an impartial role orientation and commitment to
a broad set of values, including "justice"; (2) apart from general
exhortations to virtue, existing sources on prosecution say little about
those values;t 36 (3) both the "surrogate client" model and the "adver-
sary stage" theory help to clarify the relationship between the prosecu-
tor's competing roles as "minister of justice" and "zealous advocate";
and (4) the quasi-judicial duty to "seek justice" is residual and pervasive.
In contexts characterized by reasonably effective adversary system safe-
guards, the zealous advocate's role is most appropriate; in contexts lack-
ing these safeguards, the quasi-judicial duty becomes more important.
We can amend Table One137 to reflect the preceding discussion.
TABLE Two
I. HI.
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION ADVERSARY FUNCTION
A. Role:
Surrogate client Lawyer
Impartial, judge-like Zealous, adverse
neutrality advocacy
135. When defense counsel performs incompetently the prosecutor is confronted with a choice
between two evils. Unless the prosecutor acts to protect the defendant she will allow an injustice
to occur. But to protect the defendant she must "do the defense attorney's job." This exacts
other costs. For one, it risks unwittingly interfering in sound defense tactics which only appear
ill-advised. Also, when prosecutors "help out" the defense they jeopardize the systemic interest
in encouraging defense lawyers to act competently and vigorously. Cf. Mitchell, supra note 23,
at 293. Without a division of labor the adversary system's efficiency, indeed its raison d'etre, is
threatened. These concerns might outweigh society's interest in having the prosecutor step in to
rescue an apparently endangered defendant. The adversary system has persuasive critics. See D.
LuBA, supra note 63, passim; Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Pro-
fessional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 94-101. However, my analysis takes the system as a
given. It is hard to imagine how the prosecutor could function within it if she saw her duty to
justice values as primary rather than as residual.
136. But see Webb & Turow, The Prosecutor's Function in Sentencing, 13 Loy. U. Cmt.
L.J. 641 (1982).




No adversary system Adversary system
safeguards safeguards
C. Values/Objectives:
Justice, truth, fairness, Convictions,
rights of accused penal severity
In the next part, I shall explore the prosecutor's dual role in greater
detail. Although I shall focus mainly on the student prosecutor's
predicament at the sentencing stage of the Vietnam Veteran case, my
model is meant to apply more broadly to the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in other contexts.
III. A MODEL FOR DECIDING THE STATE'S OBJECTIVE
The prosecutor's duty to seek "justice," hopelessly abstract,
becomes concrete once she must define the state's litigating posture in
a case. Should she investigate? Prosecute? What convictions and
punishment should she seek? Should she appeal? These decisions re-
quire the prosecutor to resolve normative uncertainty by choosing
among competing values. But justice cannot be done in a factual
vacuum; 138 before prosecutors reach the normative questions they must
resolve issues of factual uncertainty. Who did what to whom? We will
first discuss the latter process, and then consider the normative frame-
work within which prosecutors operate. However, as will appear, in
deciding the facts prosecutors confront role choices. They must resolve
normative conflicts, however subliminally, out of the view of any
regulating body.
A. Deciding the Facts
We usually think of the prosecutor's fact-finding role in relation to
charging discretion. 139 Depending upon the applicable standard, she
138. On the importance of factual knowledge to moral judgment, see W. FRANKENA, ETrHCS
13 (2d ed. 1973).
139. The prosecutor's fact-finding role is discussed in Abrams, supra note 36, at 7-24. See
also Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police Discretion in the Credibility Call, 47 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 15, 31 (Autumn 1984) (urging recognition of legitimate police fact-finding role).
AM. J. CRIM. LAW
decides whether the facts give rise to probable cause, a prima facie
case, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
Dispositional recommendations also assume the existence of particular
facts. Thus, in the Vietnam Veteran case, the student's proposed
recommendation-a short, suspended jail term, probation and continued
drug treatment-rested on factual assumptions regarding the nature and
circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character (as revealed in his
military and criminal records), and mitigating circumstances (stressful
events preceding the instant offense; defendant's progress in treat-
ment). To the extent that these or other relevant facts are contested or
unknown, the prosecutor lacks a factual basis for deciding the proper
disposition. In the face of factual uncertainty, prosecutors must rely on
investigation, presumptions, or some combination of the two.
In the Vietnam Veteran case the defendant's criminal record was
supplemented by mitigating information supplied by defense counsel.
In the student's account of the case, her acceptance of the "facts" as
presented by defense counsel is striking. She failed to express even the
slightest skepticism about the psychiatric report; indeed, she seemed to
presume its accuracy. Prosecutors can react in several ways to mitigat-
ing facts presented by defense counsel. They can, for example, treat
the information as irrelevant to their recommendation and advise
defense counsel to "tell it to the judge." Or they can investigate to
learn if the presented facts are accurate and complete. Finally, they
(like the student) can accept the information at face value. Given
defense counsel's adversary role, the last response is risky. But refus-
ing to consider the information risks the prosecutor's credibility and
effectiveness as an advocate if, as a result, she is left ignorant of critical
dispositional facts. In addition, without such facts, the prosecutor can-
not decide (qua client) what disposition to seek (qua lawyer). The
prosecutor's appropriate response to factual uncertainty is to inquire
and then to assess what is learned. This duty is parallel to defense
counsel's investigative duty elaborated in the American Bar Association
Standards for the Defense Function. 140
1. Factual Inquiry-Prosecutors can draw on various sources for
factual information. In the Vietnam Veteran case, for example, the stu-
dent might have attempted to test defense counsel's statements against
140. See STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 4-4.1 (detailing defense counsel's duty to investigate
facts relevant to both merits and penalty). For the investigative function of the prosecutor see
STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 3-3.1(a) ("A prosecutor ordinarily relies on police and other
investigative agencies for investigation of alleged criminal acts, but the prosecutor has an affirm-





the knowledge of the police and probation staff. She might also have
sought more information about the defendanit's drug treatment history
and prospects from defendant's psychiatrist, and perhaps from court-
affiliated clinical staff.
The prosecutor's search for the facts is constrained in at least three
ways. First, there are resource limitations. In busy offices the pros-
ecutor may have little time to investigate dispositional issues. Pros-
ecutors rely heavily on the police for investigative services, but the
police will not generally conduct dispositional investigation, and in
many courts, the probation staff is too busy to do so in "minor" cases
such as the Vietnam Veteran's case.141 Second, the prosecutor must
normally rely upon defense counsel to gather and supply some of the
needed information on disposition. The major reason for this is the
prosecutor's lack of direct access to the defendant' 42 and those (like the
veteran's psychiatrist) in a confidential relationship to defendant. But
defense counsel may fail to provide dispositional data to the prosecutor,
either because he is unwilling to do so, or because he has not acquired
it himself.
The third constraint on the prosecutor's investigative function is the
inherent obscurity of facts. Often the prosecutor's investigation will
reveal conflicting accounts of the truth. At that point the prosecutor
must decide how to regard the facts. Is the defendant the man seen
fleeing from the scene, or was he home watching television, as his
mother swears? Is the Vietnam Veteran staying straight on the metha-
done program, or did he really lose his job because he is back on
heroin? In fact, is that why his wife left? If the police say that he has
been involved in several thefts in the past few months, and only had the
bad luck to be caught this time, should they be believed? When the
facts are unclear, what should the prosecutor do?
2. Factual Assessment and the Use of Presumptions-One option
for prosecutors, which some seem to adopt, is to reject the fact-finding
141. Ideally, pre-sentence investigations and reports should be made in most cases. Cf. FED.
R. CRIm. P. 32(c) (generally requiring pre-sentence reports); STANDARDS, supra note 1, at §
18-5.1 (requiring reports in certain cases, including when incarceration for one year or more is
possible). However, in the Massachusetts' lower courts my experience has been that reports are
not routinely available. The practice varies as between federal and state courts, and among the
states. STANDARDs, supra note 1, at § 18-5.1 comment. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIE-
TY 11 (1967) (probation reports a "rarity" in lower courts). According to a national survey of
state prosecutors, even when the probation department submits pre-sentence reports the prosecu-
tion often makes recommendations independently. See Teitelbaum, The Prosecutor's Role in the
Sentencing Process: A National Survey, 1 AM. J. CRiM. L. 75, 78-79 (1972).
142. See MODEL RuLES, supra note 1, at Rule 4.2 (prohibiting lawyer communications with
party represented by counsel).
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role. A prosecutor could say, "Whether the defendant did it is for the
judge or jury to decide-it's not my job."1 43 But this response only
partially retreats from fact-finding. The agnostic prosecutor in such a
case has already made a threshold factual judgment, i.e., that probable
cause (or a prima facie case) exists to find defendant guilty. She is only
refusing to pass personal judgment on his guilt under a "preponder-
ance" or "reasonable doubt" standard. 144 Similarly, at sentencing the
prosecutor usually cannot avoid making some factual judgment as the
premise of her recommendation.
Prosecutors could resolve factual uncertainty by presuming facts
favoring guilt. Albert Alschuler speaks of the prosecutor's "working
assumption of guilt." ' 145 And Pamela Utz describes San Diego charg-
ing policies as governed by a "presumption of seriousness: ambiguities
or evidentiary questions unresolved at the time a case was brought in by
the police were deferred to preserve the office's option to prosecute at
the highest level of seriousness." 146
We can distinguish three types of factual presumptions of guilt.
First, under the presumption of credibility, the prosecutor resolves con-
flicts or ambiguities in witness accounts in favor of those supporting the
maximum guilt of the defendant. Second, under the presumption of
seriousness the prosecutor would, for example, assume the highest
property damages and most serious injuries supported by ambiguous or
conflicting versions of the facts. The last type-which for lack of a bet-
ter term I call the presumption of deviance-would resolve against the
defendant debatable claims that his conduct conformed to community
standards embedded in the criminal law. 147 Thus, a prosecutor apply-
143. "When a citizen whom I have no reason to doubt comes in and says, 'That's the guy,'
it has to be a jury question... my job is to prosecute, not judge." Alschuler, supra note 16, at
63 (quoting a prosecutor).
144. Commentators differ about whether it is ethical to proceed absent personal belief in the
defendant's guilt. Compare Uviller, supra note 23, at 1168 with M. FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at
84-88. The prevailing view, at least in the world of practice, surely permits prosecutors to do so.
Alschuler reports an instance of an assistant district attorney who would not prosecute cases unless
he was personally satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Dubbed by his col-
leagues the "best defense lawyer in the office," he left the office within his first year. Alschuler,
supra note 16, at 64 n.42. Cf. Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L.
R v. 174, 178-79 (1965). For historical interest compare ALA. ST. B. A., CODE OF ETHICS
GENERAL RuLE No. 12 (1887), reprinted in Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Ala,
St. B. A., Dec. 14-15, 1887 ("The State's attorney is criminal, if he presses for a conviction when
upon the evidence he believes the prisoner innocent. If the evidence is not plain enough to justify
a nolle pros., a public prosecutor should submit the case, with such comments as are pertinent,
accompanied by a candid statement of his own doubts.").
145. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 64 n.42.
146. Utz, supra note 85, at 104.




ing this presumption would reject a defendant's disputed claim that his
use of force against the victim was reasonably necessary to safeguard
other legally protected rights.
Several arguments support the prosecutor's use of presumptions to
avoid deciding contested facts herself. 148 For the prosecutor to decide
issues like witness credibility or whether a defendant's use of force was
"necessary" risks serious error. Many prosecutors are young and
inexperienced; 149 their judgments might therefore be less reliable than
judgments by judicial organs. Furthermore, by bringing a doubtful
case the prosecutor ensures that witnesses whose testimony would sup-
port conviction will get their "day in court."15 0 Providing a forum to
victims, civilian witnesses and the police satisfies important needs
including, but not limited to, the obvious political need to forestall
public criticism of the district attorney's office. Maintaining public
confidence in the justice system and channeling psychological tensions
into a neutral forum also serve the public interest.
Finally, as an advocate for the public's interest in law enforcement,
the prosecutor arguably fails if she turns a less than sympathetic ear to
evidence that would advance that interest. The prosecutor works in an
adversary setting. The defense counsel will make "working assump-
tions" of credibility, seriousness and deviance that are the opposite of
those just proposed for prosecutors. The prosecutor would therefore
fail in her adversary duty to present the strongest case for the public if
she did not press the doubtful case.151
These arguments are persuasive, but if applied too rigidly, risk
leading prosecutors to abdicate their ultimate duty to advance the whole
range of societal interests, including the right of citizens to be free of
criminal charges absent credible evidence of guilt. Given the pros-
ecutor's largely uncontrolled discretion to set the accusation process in
motion and the serious impact of that process on the defendant and
148. Using these presumptions allows a prosecutor to bring a case without personally satisfy-
ing herself of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra text accompanying note
144.
149. See supra text accompanying note 43.
150. On the other hand, the prosecutor's decision to reduce or dismiss a charge is effectively
unreviewable. Although judicial approval is normally required for the dismissal of charges the
review is generally only formal. See A. GoLDsTIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 14-19 (1981).
151. "[The prosecutor] does, after all, fulfill a role as advocate in a dialectic system for the
divination of truth. Flawed though that system may be, the conscientious prosecutor need have no
scruples to don his barrister's hat and take a doubtful matter to court." Uviller, supra note 23,
at 1168.
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society, 152 the prosecutor must screen cases responsibly. Presumptions
of guilt are justified only when factual issues are truly in equipoise. A
prosecutor in a rape case who is neither entirely confident nor strongly
doubtful of the victim's credibility is justified in prosecuting the case.
But when a prosecutor strongly suspects that her witness-often a police
officer153-is lying, she cannot blithely take refuge behind a presump-
tion of credibility. The prosecutor has a duty to confront her doubts
about credibility (or "seriousness" or "deviance"). The "presump-
tions" must be regarded as only prima facie binding, and at some unde-
finable point, rebuttable.154 In most cases, despite the risks inherent in
prosecutorial "prejudgment" of facts, the prosecutor cannot respon-
sibly abstain from that task.
In sum, the prosecutor's usual orientation should be one of special
alertness to the existence of facts supporting guilt and a corresponding
eagerness to seek them out. In "borderline" cases she should rely on
rebuttable presumptions of guilt to resolve factual conflicts and certain-
ties against the defendant.
We can amend Table Two155 to reflect the preceding discussion.
152. Including possibly the defendant's pre-trial incarceration and loss of employment,
damage to his reputation, material and emotional costs of defense, possibility of wrongful convic-
tion, and waste of scarce crime control resources.
153. Probably the most difficult and recurring ethical dilemma for our student prosecutors
arises when they suspect police witnesses of lying. Police culture justifies "white lies" for the
sake of convicting factually guilty defendants. See J. EISENSrEN & H. JACOB, supra note 17, at
303; Skolnick, supra note 54, at 55; Younger, supra note 54, at 551. Skolnick suggests that
judicial acceptance of police deception in the investigation process "enhances moral acceptance of
deception by detectives in the... testimonial stages.., and thus increases the probability of its
occurrence." Skolnick, supra note 54, at 45. For a helpful discussion of conditions under which
lying is morally justifiable, see S. BOK, LYING, 81-106 (1979).
The professional codes do not clearly guide prosecutors in situations where they suspect, but
do not "know," their witness's testimony is false. See MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at DR
7-102(4); MODEL Rur.Es, supra note 1, at § 3.3(a)(4). Professor Uviller proposes that a pro-
secutor should not use a witness if she "has good reason to believe that [the] witness is lying about
a material fact ...... Uviller, supra note 23, at 1159.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 208-16. For the concept of prima facie duties, see W.
Ross, THE RiGHT AND THE GOOD 22, 41-42 (1930).





QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION ADVERSARY FUNCTION
A. Role:
Surrogate client Lawyer
Impartial, judge-like Zealous, adverse
neutrality advocacy
B. Setting:
No adversary system Adversary system
safeguards safeguards
C. Values/Objectives:
Justice, truth, fairness, Convictions,
rights of accused penal severity
D. Process:
Factual inquiryl Presumptions of
assessment factual guilt
B. The Question of Values
I have been developing a model for deciding the state's litigating
posture in any particular case. I have suggested that the prosecutor
must first 156 settle upon some working version of the relevant facts.
Once she has arrived at an understanding of the facts relevant to guilt
and disposition, she must decide her objective. In the Vietnam Veteran
156. To say that one "first" decides what happened and "then" what governing norms
apply, is really a convenient fiction. In most if not all cases the apparent "facts" and, perhaps,
therefore the relevant norms, continually change during the life of a case. See L. CARTER, supra
note 36, at 14. In a recent wel-publicized example the United States Department of Justice dis-
missed defense-fraud charges against General Dynamics after government investigators discovered
new information. According to Criminal Division chief William F. Weld, "the facts went south,
as we say in the trade." Shenon, Justice Dept. Says It Was Wrong To Prosecute General
Dynanics, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1987, at D30, col. 1.
AM. J. CRIM. LAW
case, for example, assume my student prosecutor has satisfied herself
that the facts supplied by defense counsel are true. Does it follow that
she, on behalf of her public client, should seek probation? Or would a
jail term better serve the public interest? Either choice, to be "nice"
or "hard nosed," would promote some values at the expense of others.
The student correctly perceived the dilemma to be governed by her "in-
credibly vague" role-"to seek justice and not merely to convict." 157
She was left with several poignant questions: "What did I owe this
defendant?" "Am I becoming too involved?" Being "too nice"?
"Should I have concerned myself with the defendant's record and
welfare?" How should we respond?
One obvious response is that no set of guidelines or depth of insight
can produce "the" correct sentence recommendation. To some extent
the recommendation will depend on a prosecutor's philosophy of pun-
ishment. But even if a prosecution agency explicitly instructed its
attorneys to follow a particular philosophy, applying it would not be
simple.
It is one thing, and a difficult thing, to determine the punish-
ment that is commensurate with a given crime; it is another,
and a far more difficult, thing to determine the punishment that
is commensurate with an offender's blameworthiness . . . [or]
the costs and benefits of punishing a given offender in a certain
way.158
Different prosecutors with the same general approach to sentencing will
disagree in particular cases. Still, it is worthwhile to construct a model
recommendation process against which to view the student's approach
in this case.
The process is two-fold. First, the prosecutor must become aware
of the public interests bearing on her decision. Then she must weigh
the competing interests and choose the best overall objective. This
process serves the same function as legal counseling of an individual
client; the lawyer helps the client identify (and then weigh) the advan-
tages and disadvantages of choices in the litigation according to the
client's own value system.159 The prosecutor must conduct a similar
inquiry regarding choices as to the ends and means of criminal litiga-
157. MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at EC 7-13.
158. Wertheimer, Should Punishment Fit the Crime?, 3 Soc. THEORY & PP.AC. 403, 413
(1975).
159. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING, 146-50 (1977). Cf.
T. SHAFrER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAwYER 21-22 (1934) (arguing the lawyer's obligation




tion. But she must act as both lawyer and surrogate client. In the next
two sections I shall discuss first, the search for applicable norms ("nor-
mative inquiry"), and then, in the context of the Vietnam Veteran case,
the process of weighing competing norms in a particular case ("nor-
mative assessment").
1. Normative Inquiry: The Dual Role-The student prosecuting
the Vietnam Veteran wrote that incarceration "would be counter-
productive for the defendant" and that "there were many more com-
peting interests [of justice] ... to be served... than the one to convict
.... "160 But she does not articulate the competing interests and seems
only partially aware of them. She needs to understand better the pros-
ecutor's dual role, which requires her to convict (punish) 161 criminals
and to "seek justice." I shall discuss these two goals in order.
a. "Punishment" and "Justice. " If we asked "Why should we
punish criminals?" then, depending on the respondent's philosophical
persuasion, we would be told: "To inflict just deserts" by a retribu-
tivist, "To protect society by controlling crime" by a utilitarian, or
some combination of these answers. Because utilitarians 162 and almost
all retributivists163 accept the relevance (if not the primacy) of both
160. See supra note 25.
161. Of course, conviction is itself a punishment; in the remainder of this Article I shall use
the more general term.
162. Mill regarded desert as a core principle of justice, ultimately justified on grounds of
utility. J. MILL, UTIuArr kSM 41 (1861). Modem utilitarians continue to defend desert-based
punishment on grounds of general utility. See, e.g., H. SmowICK, METHODS OF ETmIcs 445-46
(7th ed. 1962) ("What [is desired] under the name of Ideal Justice... is the distribution of good
and evil according to Desert. This is broadly in harmony with Utilitarianism; since we obviously
encourage the production of general happiness by rewarding men for felicific conduct. ... );
Sprigge, A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey, in CONTMPORARY UT rAIANISM 261, 267-70
(M.D. Bayles ed. 1968) (the "just" and overall utilitarian punishment generally coincide). The
same can be said of the economic analysts who have written about the criminal law. Some of their
writings have seemed to assume that deterrence is the only goal of prosecutors, who pursue it by
"maximiz[ing] the expected number of convictions weighted by their sentences, subject to a
budget constraint .... Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61, 98
(1971). See also Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289,
291-92 (1983) (goal of criminal justice system to get the maximum deterrent punch out of whatever
resources are committed to crime control). But more recent economic writing acknowledges that
other goals, including retribution, require explanation. See Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. Ray. 1193, 1194-95, 1231 (1985) (disavowing the view that "effi-
ciency is or ought to be the only social value considered by legislatures and courts in creating and
interpreting the rules of the criminal law," but postponing consideration of the moral view of
criminal law, while doubting that it is "as good a positive theory of criminal law as the
economic."); Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deter-
rent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, n.1 (1985).
163. See, e.g., T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 13, 148-49, 155
(1971); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 73-76 (1976); McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to
Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY U=TLrrAmANIsM 239, 257 (M.D. Bayles ed. 1968). Wertheimer,
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desert and crime control, we can put aside the philosophical dispute for
now and accept both as prosecutorial objectives.
The objective of inflicting "just deserts" requires or permits
1 64
punishment proportional to the defendant's culpability in committing
the crime. "Crime control" objectives are promoted by punishments
that deter and morally educate165 the general public, and that deter,
restrain and rehabilitate the individual defendant.
The prosecutor's second principal goal is "justice." The philo-
sophical literature on this subject is both vast and contentious,166 but
despite the many points of controversy, most theorists agree the three
core principles of justice are "equality, .... respect for rights" and
"desert." 167 Equality requires the prosecutor to be consistent, treating
similar cases in a similar fashion. 168 Respect for rights requires the
prosecutor to honor a defendant's rights. I shall call this "procedural
justice.' 1 69 Just desert, as defined above in connection with crime con-
supra note 158, at 411. But "pure" retributivists (see infra note 164) entirely reject crime control
as an aim of punishment. See, e.g., Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESIPONSBILITv,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179 passim (F. Schoeman ed., 1987).
164. Wertheimer distinguishes three types of retributivism according to how each would set
punishments: (1) on the principle of "an eye for an eye"; (2) in proportion to the gravity of the
crime; (3) in proportion to gravity, less if appropriate on utilitarian grounds. The first type is not
currently in favor; the second is "pure" ("strong" or "positive") retributivism; the third is
"compromised" ("weak," "negative" or "teleological") retributivism. Wertheimer, supra note
158, at 404-05. See also Murphy, Retributivism and the State's Interest in Punishment, in CRIM.
INAL JUSTICE: NoMos XXVII 156, 159 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman ed. 1985).
165. See Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CIuM. L., C. & P.S.
176, 179-80 (1952) (punishment "helps to form and to strengthen the public's moral code and
thereby creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime.").
166. For an overview and an extensive bibliography see 0. BIRD, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE
(1967). Philosophical writings distinguish between "distributive" and "retributive" justice, and
treat questions of just punishment under the latter head. See W. FRANKENA, supra note 138, at
48. To avoid the confusion of discussing utilitarian theories of "retributive" justice, I have
ignored that distinction in the body of this Article. By citing the general agreement on the prin-
ciples of justice, I do not mean to deny that there is considerable disagreement on the ethical
theories giving rise to the principles. Nor do I mean to imply that most philosophers would agree
on the proper resolution of particular moral dilemmas.
167. See generally J. MILL, supra note 162, at 49-51; Cohen, Pure Legal Advocates and
Moral Agents: Two Concepts of a Lawyer in an Adversary System, 4 CUM. JUST. ETHICS 38, 39
(1985). Regarding equality, see 0. BIRD, supra note 166, at 99; Bedau, Radical Egalitarianism,
in JUSTICE AND EQUAUTY 168, 171 (H.A. Bedau ed. 1971) ("justice involves equality"); Rawls,
Justice as Fairness, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 76-102 (H.A. Bedau ed. 1971). Regarding respect
for rights, see id. at passim. On desert, see A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 163, 143-47.
168. Cohen, supra note 167, at 39.
169. Philosophers define justice to include respect for both legal and moral rights. See, e.g.,
J. MILL, supra note 162, at 49; Cohen, supra note 167, at 46. For simplicity's sake I have nar-
rowed the category to legal rights. Some refer to this as the principle of "formal" (as opposed
to "substantive") justice. See Davis, Sentencing: Must Justice be Even-Handed?, in 1 LAW &
PHIL. 77, 100 (1982).
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trol, requires a prosecutor to seek for a defendant the punishment (or
exoneration) that he rightfully deserves. I shall call this "substantive
justice." The prosecutor's duty to "seek justice" can therefore be
defined as the duty to promote equality, procedural justice, and substan-
tive justice.
We can amend Table Three 70 to show the changes in the model.
TABLE FOUR
I. II.
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION ADVERSARY FUNCTION
A. Role:
Surrogate client Lawyer
Impartial, judge-like Zealous, adverse
neutrality advocacy
B. Setting:




1. [Desert/"Substantive " 1. [Desert]
2. [Rights/"Procedural"] 2. Crime Control:.
3. [Equality] deter, restrain
D. Process:
Factual inquiry/ Presumptions of
assessment factual guilt
In Table Four, "procedural justice" and "equality" are bracketed
to indicate that we should regard them as constraints, rather than as
ends in themselves. Prosecutors have no roving mandate to promote
170. See supra text accompanying note 155. Additions to Table 3 are italicized.
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those values; rather, we wish them to ensure fair and equal treatment of
defendants in the course of pursuing substantive justice. One might
also question whether desert is a primary objective or only a constraint
on the pursuit of crime control values. This question implicates the
retributivist-utilitarian debate mentioned above. 171 Depending on the
answer, one would draw somewhat different conclusions about the rela-
tionship between the prosecutor's dual roles. Almost all contemporary
punishment theorists agree that the governing criterion for setting
punishments is crime control, while desert is merely a constraint. 172 In
other words, punishment should be fixed so as to maximize public pro-
tection, but may not exceed what the defendant deserves. Because this
view is so widely shared, I have adopted it for purposes of this discus-
sion, and have so indicated by bracketing "desert" in Table Four.
Finally, the goal of just desert is common to both aspects of the
dual role. The principal tension between the duties to "punish" and to
"do justice" is therefore between the goal of crime control, on the one
hand, and the values of equality and procedural justice on the other.
"Overzealousness" often takes the form of pursuing punishment
without regard to the latter constraints.
b. The Moral Dimension. Until now I have been defining the dual
role in terms of state interests or objectives, but this does not entirely
capture the quality of prosecutorial decisions. Routine prosecutorial
decisions have great moral significance inasmuch as they cause the
defendant and/or others to suffer or avoid serious harm. This gives the
prosecutor a corresponding moral duty that deserves examination.
How, if at all, is a prosecutor's personal morality related to her
professional role? An answer can be drawn from recent discussions of
the "moral distance" between the lawyer's moral duty and that of an
ordinary person. 173 Does the professional role justify harmful actions
that would be considered wrong outside it? Some have argued against
this mutual opposition between private and professional morality. They
propose, rather, an "integrated" conception, which emphasizes the role
of the lawyer's own moral judgment in resolving professional dilemmas
and de-emphasizes the importance of codified principles of "profes-
sional responsibility." 174 According to Gerald Postema,
171. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
172. See T. HONDERICH, supra note 163, at 148-49, 155. But retribution may be returning
to fashion. See R. SINGER, JusT DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 11-34
(1979); A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 163, 73-76; Moore, supra note 163, at 214-15.
173. See, e.g., Postema, supra note 116, 63-71; Wasserstrom, supra note 67, at 1-2, 9-14.
174. "ITihe moral dilemmas facing a lawyer generally cannot be reduced to a single perspec-
tive. . . . On the contrary, our concerns are characterized by a complexity and a variety which
resist reduction to a uniform scale." Postema, supra note 116, at 67.
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The principles or values provide a framework within which to
work and a target at which to aim. But they do not determine
decisions. Instead, we rely on our judgment to achieve a
coherence among the conflicting values which is sensitive to
the particular circumstances. Judgment thus involves the abil-
ity to take a comprehensive view of the values and concerns at
stake, based on one's experience and knowledge of the
world. 17
5
The primary concern is not with the definition, structuring,
and delimitation of a lawyer's professional responsibilities (his
official concerns and duties), nor with those situations in which
the lawyer is to be held professionally responsible (i.e., liable
to blame or sanction). Rather, the concern is with respon-
sibility as a virtue or trait of character. The focus, then, is on
the notion of a responsible person-or perhaps better, on the
notion of a person's sense of responsibility. 176
Postema presents a conception of professional obligation that "inte-
grat[es] to a significant degree the moral personality of the individual
with the performance of role responsibilities." 177 He implies that to be
a "good lawyer" one must be a morally good person, that is, one who
has a virtuous character and who acts according to proper values. For
prosecutors this view is reinforced when we consider that their accepted
professional duty is to "seek justice," which implies a moral commit-
ment.
What, then, should we require of prosecutors? Ethical theorists
generally agree on the core moral virtues, which include truthfulness,
benevolence, trustworthiness, moral autonomy, moral courage and
finally, "justness." 1 78 Of these qualities, the last three are especially
important here. "Justness," of course, requires loyalty to the three
values defined above: equality, respect for rights and desert. "Moral
autonomy" means that a prosecutor is "regularly disposed to do his
own moral thinking.. . and then, in turn, to act upon his considered
judgment"; "moral courage" requires that he be willing to endure
substantial hardship for obeying his conscience.1
79
175. Id. at 68 (footnote omitted). Cf. Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1061,
1149-50 (moral choices not simply deduced from general principles or rules).
176. Postema, supra note 116, at 70-71.
177. Id. at 83. See also Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J.
195, 197 (1986) ("Sound ethical codes in the profession are those which depend on character.").
178. See generally T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
265-66 (1979); W. FRANKENA, supra note 138, passim; Cohen, supra note 167, at 39-41. Of
course, theorists disagree on the sources and relative primacy of different principles.
179. Cohen, supra note 167, at 41. Of course, moral autonomy is not inconsistent with con-
sulting others on moral questions. See infra text accompanying notes 208-16.
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Both moral autonomy and moral courage are essential to the
"moral point of view," i.e., the way in which, according to ethical
theorists, actors should approach moral decisions. This is "the moral
way of . . .deciding what one should do, as distinct from, say, the
aesthetic, legal or prudential . . .ways." 18 0  According to William
Frankena:
[T]he moral point of view ... entails (a) deciding for oneself
what one should do, (b) deciding this, not by asking what one
wants to do, what is to one's own advantage, or what will hap-
pen to one if one does this or that, but by some kind of con-
sideration of what it would be like if everyone were to act
likewise. 181
Prosecutorial duty, then, implies commitment both to accepted moral
virtues/values 182 and to a moral reasoning process.
We can amend Table Four 183 to reflect this feature of the model.
180. Frankena, Moral Education, in PERSPEcTivEs ON MORALITY 163, 166 (1976) ("The
main question in connection with content [of moral education] is that what has to be passed on is,
finally, not any particular moral rule or virtue, but an understanding of what morality is and a
commitment to thinking and acting in the moral way.").
181. Id. at 166-67. See also W. FRANKENA, supra note 138, at 111-12.
182. I am treating "virtue" and "values" as equivalents. Philosophers have debated whether
morality primarily consists in "doing" good things or in "being" good, i.e., in cultivating good
traits or dispositions. See generally T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 178, at 261-65;
W. FRANKENA, supra note 138, ch. 4. These writers agree that the "ethics of being" and the
"ethics of virtue" are complementary perspectives. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note
178, at 265; W. FRANKENA, supra note 138, at 65-7. Neither moral action guides nor virtues
need be taken as primary, because "for every principle, rule, or ideal, there is a correspond-
ing virtue, that is, a corresponding disposition to act in a certain way." T. BEAUCHAMP & J.
CHILORESS, supra note 178, at 265. Of course, this viewpoint validates the traditional insistence
on the prosecutor's virtuous character. See supra text accompanying notes 103-113.
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Against this background,18 4 let us turn to the process of normative
assessment.
184. By emphasizing the importance of moral values and reasoning to prosecutorial decision-
making, I do not mean to suggest either of two propositions which some might infer. The first is:
"What counts in prosecutorial decisionmaking is individual moral judgment. Therefore, we can
forget the importance of positive law constraints such as statutes, rules, or guidelines, and even of
case supervision." On the contrary, I favor expanded controls on prosecutorial discretion. But I
focus here on the exercise of discretion which now exists, and which-even assuming greater
AM. J. CRIM. LAW Vol. 15:197 (1988)
2. Normative Assessment-Once the prosecutor has identified the
public interests bearing on her decision, she is prepared to decide the
state's litigating posture in the particular case. In the Vietnam Veteran
case, the student prosecutor had a choice of dispositional recommenda-
tions ranging from dismissal (requested by defense counsel) to incarcer-
ation (urged by her supervisor).1 85 Assuming she has satisfied herself
that the facts supplied by defense counsel are true, how should she go
about choosing?
I shall first discuss how a judge might go about sentencing the Viet-
nam Veteran.18 6 I shall then consider whether a prosecutor should
exercise her dispositional discretion any differently.
a. Judicial Sentencing Discretion. Most writers on discretionary
judicial sentencing seem to agree on three points.187 First, the process
efforts at controlling it-will probably continue to exist. See infra text accompanying notes
232-34. Rules and guidelines "provide a framework within which to work and a target at which
to aim," but they do not determine decisions. Postema, supra note 116, at 68.
The second proposition is: "Prosecutors should exercise discretionary power in accordance
with their personal morality, making no special allowance for their professional role. For exam-
ple, if a prosecutor happens especially to value the duty of benevolence, and strongly to disapprove
of imprisonment, then she should treat defendants leniently." But I am not urging "deprofes-
sionalization" of professional roles. As Postema argues:
[Tihe moral universe of a professional role characteristically is narrower than that of
ordinary morality. But since the moral universe defines the range of considerations that
a role agent may take into account in choosing a course of action, it is possible that other-
wise relevant considerations may be effectively excluded from the agent's deliberation.
Thus cases may arise in which an agent is required by his role to act without considering
the full range of moral reasons before him; rather, he must consider only those moral
reasons within his particular moral universe.
Id. at 71.
Just as rules and guidelines constrain the prosecutor's discretion, so does her professional role,
which might dictate the inclusion or exclusion of particular values, and/or prima facie preference
for some over others. Postema defends the "exclusionary character of professional morality" in
terms of the social value of such roles, which in order to function may require a "division of social
and moral labor." Id. at 72. In this Article I justify certain prosecutorial "exclusions" based on
the needs of the adversary system. If one rejects that system's value, one will also question the
exclusion. Defining the prosecutor's "moral universe," in Postema's sense, is my goal in this
Article.
185. The crime of larceny "under one hundred dollars" is punishable by up to one year in
jail or a fine of not more than three hundred dollars. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 266 § 30(1)
(West Supp. 1987).
186. Building a model around the Vietnam Veteran case assumes two features of the sentenc-
ing process: First, that judges have substantial sentencing discretion; and second, that prosecutors
make sentencing arguments and/or recommend specific sentences to the judge. See Teitelbaum,
supra note 141, at 75-76 (about seventy percent of responding district attorney's offices recom-
mend specific sentences). Of course, the practice in some jurisdictions, and some reform pro-
posals, are otherwise. See Kuh, Sentencing: Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney's
Office, 11 CIuM. L. BULL. 62 (1975) (prosecutors should not "usurp" judicial role by recom-
mending specific sentences).
187. Punishment goals can vary according to institutional role: the legislature's goal in enact-
ing sentencing laws might differ from the goals of enforcement personnel such as judges at sen-
Virtuous Prosecutor
should begin with selection of a presumptive sentence (or range) based
on desert, reflecting relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. Sec-
ond, the presumptive penalty is subject to further mitigation on grounds
unrelated to desert. Third, these nondesert clemency factors should be
invoked cautiously.'18
Deciding first what sentence the Vietnam Veteran deserves is not
simple. The maximum penalty is one year in jail. The judge might
proceed by ranking the defendant's offense on a range of the "worst"
and "least bad" ways in which one could commit the crime of larcency
under one hundred dollars.' 8 9 In this calculus the judge considers all
circumstances of the crime bearing on culpability, including aggrava-
tion (e.g., helplessness of victim, abuse of trust) and mitigation (e.g.,
duress, necessity, provocation). We can all imagine more blameworthy
larcenous acts than this one-the defendant might have stolen medicine
from a sick child. But we might debate the evil of shoplifting relative
to other sorts of minor theft. We might also find it difficult to weigh
other circumstances bearing on culpability, such as the defendant's
criminal record190 (aggravating); his war heroism and drug habit that
"triggered" his prior crimes (mitigating); the recent stressful circum-
tencing, prosecutors recommending dispositions or police officers deciding whether to arrest. See
A. Ross, ON GUILT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT 61-65 (1975); H. HART, Prolegomenon to
the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1-12 (1968); Wertheimer,
Deterrence and Retribution, 86 ETHICS 181 passim (1975-76). Most of the literature on punish-
ment and sentencing concerns the legislative level: philosophers debate the justifications for
punishment per se. See A. Ross, supra, at 61-65; Hart, supra, at 1-12. Legal scholars, criticiz-
ing the present sentencing system, argue the merits of various reforms. See, e.g., Frankel,
Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 45-48 (1972). Only a few scholars, on whose
work the following discussion draws, have attempted to prescribe systematically how judges
should exercise their broad discretion under the current system. See Davis, How to Make the
Punishment Fit the Crime, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII, 119 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
ed. 1985); H. GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 448-5f (1979); Davis, supra note 169, at
98-103.
188. The models differ in detail but most require the judge to consider both desert and crime
control in this way. See H. GROSS, supra note 187, at 448-51; Davis, supra note 169, at 100;
Wertheimer, supra note 158, passim. For Norval Morris the principle of desert supplies the max-
imum and minimum sentence, but utilitarian principles govern the "fine tuning." Morris, Punish-
ment, Desert and Rehabilitation, in SENTENCING 264 (H. Gross & A. von Hirsch ed. 1981).
Andrew von Hirsch, by contrast, would permit departure from the principle of "commensurate
desert" only in exceptional cases. See A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 125 (1976); A. von
Hirsch, Utilitarian Sentencing Resuscitated: The American Bar Association's Second Report on
Criminal Sentencing, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 772, 773 (1981).
189. This description is based upon Davis, supra note 187, at 147-48 and Davis, supra note
169, at 86-97.
190. Von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591,
608-09 (1981) argues for the retributive relevance of the defendant's criminal record. But see R.
SINGER, supra note 172, at 67-72.
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stances, i.e., the loss of his job, getting mugged, and losing his wife
(mitigating); and if he stole to get drugs, his diminished responsibility
for this crime (mitigating).
When the judge has weighed the foregoing aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors and arrived at a presumptive sentence based on desert (for
example, three months in jail), he considers whether to reduce the sen-
tence on utilitarian grounds. This invites consideration of a host of fac-
tors bearing upon public'protection, including the penalty's contribution
to general deterrence and "moral education" of the public, as well as
the defendant's dangerousness both short- and long-term. The penal-
ty's rehabilitative (dis)utility would be relevant for most theorists only
as it bears on the last factor, individual prevention. 91
On the side of mitigation, defendant's progress in drug treatment,
and the devastating but unlikely combination of stressful events trigger-
ing the current incident, suggest that incarceration is unnecesary to pro-
tect the public. In fact, by interfering with his therapy and employment
prospects, increasing his level of stress, and returning him to a convict
subculture, jail would be-to use the student's word-'"counter-produc-
tive." A suspended jail term, probation and continued drug treatment
would arguably better serve the public's need for protection now and in
the future.
But aggravating factors also exist that, while not allowed to
increase the sentence above what he deserves, might cancel out the
mitigations. Some factors indicating the need for incarceration relate to
general prevention, like deterrence of potential shoplifters and the
moral-educative impact of a severe sentence. Individual prevention
might also require a jail term because, despite defendant's progress in
treatment, he has demonstrated an inability to behave when under
stress. Incarceration might motivate him to greater self-control in the
future. At least it will keep him out of department stores for a few
months and give him time to become drug-free. 192 If motivated to stay
straight, he can presumably continue drug treatment while in jail.
One could rejoin by pointing out that general prevention depends
more on the public perception of enforcement than enforcement itself.
In such a low-visibility case, the public will not know whether the
defendant was jailed or not. And there are additional costs of incarcer-
ating the defendant, such as his suffering and that of his friends and
191. P. Low, J. JEFFRIES, & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 27 (2d ed.
1986). Most contemporary theorists oppose making rehabilitation an "aim" of sentencing. See
STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 18-2.2 comment.




family, the cost of keeping him in jail, even the impact on correctional
staff and inmates of squeezing another body into an overcrowded jail.
These harms are concrete and immediate when compared to preventive
benefits, which tend to be both speculative and remote.
Scholars have noted the natural tendency in sentencing to be more
impressed by the costs than the benefits of penalties.1 93 That is one
reason why many urge caution in reducing a presumptive, deserved
sentence on utilitarian grounds. 194 Another reason is the great diffi-
culty of predicting the consequences to the defendant or society of any
particular punishment. And a third is the eroding effect of individual
clemency upon the other sentencing goals and constraints-desert,
general deterrence and equality.
195
In deciding whether to reduce the "deserved" three-month jail
sentence, a judge sentencing the Vietnam Veteran would need to weigh
these competing benefits and costs, keeping in mind the danger of
focusing too much on the latter. In a process he might find difficult,
lonely, even agonizing, he would make the decision he thought was
right.
b. The Prosecutor's Role. The student prosecutor wanted to
recommend a probationary sentence. Without judging that decision,
her approach is easy to criticize. Her account 96 suggests that she
adopted a narrow, defense-oriented view of the public interests at
stake. She focused mainly on the defendant's drug problems and the
futility of jailing him. She was attuned to factors that mitigate
culpability and dangerousness, but apparently oblivious to aggravations.
The thought "general deterrence," it seems, never crossed her mind.
How should she have approached the situation? Like a judge? Or
more like a "zealous advocate" for penal severity?
197
193. See Davis, supra note 187, at 149; Wertheimer, supra note 187, passim. This tendency
is widespread. See Moore, supra note 163, at 210 (examining tendency to forget the victim and
direct all our compassion to the sole remaining actor-the defendant).
194. See Davis, supra note 187, at 149; Wertheimer, supra note 187, at 186 (utilitarian pun-
ishment principles appropriate only at legislative stage; utilitarian mitigation at sentencing stage
undermines general deterrence, and "promotes neither justice nor utility."). But see Morris,
supra note 188, at 264 (desert is a "limiting principle" supplying only rough proportionality;
utilitarian principles govern the "fine tuning.").
195. These concerns, along with loss of faith in the "rehabilitative ideal," have fueled the
current national movement to restrict judicial sentencing discretion. A major effect of such
reforms would to be recognize utilitarian values at the legislative level in setting penalties, but to
restrict severely or eliminate judicial mitigation on utilitarian grounds at the sentencing stage. See
generally STANDARDS, supra note 1, at §§ 18-1, 18-2, introduction and comments.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
197. According to one national survey, about half the responding prosecutors who participate
at sentencing take a "quasi-judicial" role, and recommend exactly the same sentence that they
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(i) Preference for Maximizing Punishment: The Use of Presump-
tions. I suggested earlier, in discussing the problem of factual uncer-
tainty, that prosecutors should employ rebuttable presumptions of
factual guilt.198 One could similarly argue that prosecutors should
generally prefer severity, as expressed in presumptions favoring: (1) a
"highest and most" charging policy; 199 (2) the maximum penalties
obtainable; (3) broad construction of substantive penal laws; and (4)
narrow construction of procedural protections. The Vietnam Veteran
case invites consideration of the second presumption. Should a pros-
ecutor seek the most severe penalty available? 200
The notion that prosecutors should seek literally the maximum pen-
alties they think they can "get" violates the principle of parsimony,
which holds that punishment should not exceed what is necessary to
achieve its purpose. 20 1 To seek (and so perhaps to win)20 2 a one-year
sentence for a defendant who, in the prosecutor's judgment, deserves
only three months, or whose incarceration past three months would not
benefit society, makes no sense.
Does rejection of a presumption for "maximum severity" mean
that a prosecutor should recommend the same sentence she would
impose as a judge? I think not, in light of the inherent arbitrariness of
discretionary sentencing and the adversary context of the recommenda-
tion. Sentencing is arbitrary in the sense that the legislature typically
leaves broad discretion to judges, who cannot precisely calculate the
demands of desert, equality and utility.203 At best, these criteria permit
a judge to isolate a range of acceptable penalties from which to choose.
Within that range, the defense will surely advocate the most lenient,
would impose as a judge; the other half act as "advocates," suggesting aggravating factors to
counterbalance the mitigating factors presented by the defense. Teitelbaum, supra note 141, at 76.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 145-54.
199. See Alschuler, supra note 16, at 85 (most prosecutors report that they regularly charge
the highest and most that the evidence permits); Utz, supra note 84, at 106. But see STANDARDS,
supra note 1, at § 3-6.1(a) stating that
The prosecutor should not make the severity of sentences the index of his or her effec-
tiveness. To the extent that the prosecutor becomes involved in the sentencing process,
he or she should seek to assure that a fair and informed judgment is made on the sentence
and to avoid unfair sentence disparities.
200. The other presumptions are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 218-28.
201. Morris, supra note 188, at 258, 266. For retributivists, this is called the principle of
proportional desert. Wertheimer, supra note 158, at 404-08. For utilitarians, the principle of
economic deterrence. See T. HONDERICH, supra note 163, at 61; Wertheimer, supra note 158, at
404-08.
202. According to Teitelbaum, prosecutors report that their sentence recommendations sig-
nificantly influence judges. Teitelbaum, supra note 141, at 80-82.
203. But see Morris, supra note 188, at 258-59, 267 (desert is inherently imprecise, but deter-




and so the prosecutor's adversary role prima facie obliges her to ad-
vocate the most severe. This is not the same as an unmitigated duty to
"seek the maximum"; it operates only under conditions of genuine
uncertainty. 20 4 And it should be rebuttable when the absence or failure
of adversary system safeguards makes the prosecutor's adversary stance
inappropriate, such as, for example, when the defendant appears pro
se. 2 0 5
Furthermore, the prosecutor's adversary role obliges her, when
sentencing mitigations are addressed, to articulate and defend those
public interests that, but for her efforts, might not receive adequate
attention. Defense counsel can be expected to minimize or ignore fac-
tors aggravating defendant's blameworthiness, as well as the commun-
ity's crime control needs. 20 6 He is likely to stress the disadvantages of
punishing the defendant and to disregard the value of treating the defen-
dant equally with others of equal culpability. The prosecutor should
consider herself prima facie bound to air the other side. Only in excep-
tional circumstances, and after appropriate thought and consultation,
should she reject that duty.
20 7
(ii) Consultation and Introspection. The prosecutor's prima facie
duty to argue reasons for sentencing the defendant to the most severe
deserved punishment translates, in effect, into a presumption against
mitigation. Deciding what punishment an offender deserves, and
whether this presumption is overcome by considerations of compassion
or utility, are accomplished by a process of consultation and intro-
spection 20 8 about each case.
Unless the case is routine and the prosecutor experienced, she will
benefit from discussing with others the scope and intensity of the rele-
vant public interests. Her consultants might include several classes of
persons who can offer relevant facts and/or normative perspectives.
First, she should consider the views of persons immediately involved in
204. A possible exception arises in practice before a judge who predictably "splits the differ-
ence" between prosecutorial and defense recommendations. In that circumstance, recommending
a higher sentence than is believed proper is justified as a kind of strategic "puffing." But the
practice sacrifices candor and risks loss of credibility and, far worse, "winning" an excessive and
unjust sentence.
205. The experience related in supra note 55, suggests that prosecutors do modify their role
in such circumstance.
206. Perhaps, as in the Vietnam Veteran case, by promoting a medical model of personal
responsibility.
207. For example, a case of a seriously ill defendant or a drug-dependent defendant willing
to enter residential drug-treatment. And, possibly, in the Vietnam Veteran case.
208. For a discussion of the process of consultation and introspection see S. BOK, supra note
153, at 90-108.
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the case, such as victims, witnesses and the police. 20 9 In the Vietnam
Veteran case, for example, the department store's indifference to the
proceedings would have a different meaning for the prosecutor's deci-
sion than their expressed alarm over a recent rash of shoplifting, treated
with apparent unconcern by the courts. Of course, prosecutors ignore
pressures from potentially powerful critics at their peril. "Cover Your
[Rear]" is a basic rule, quickly learned. But consultation serves an
important need beyond the prosecutor's political survival. If shoplifting
at the victim store is in fact getting out of control (or is so perceived),
the merchant community's expressed frustration with the court system's
response sheds light on the relative costs of probation and incarcera-
tion. 210  General deterrent values might outweigh arguments for miti-
gation.
A second, obvious source of advice lies within the prosecutor's
own agency: her supervisors and experienced peers. Consulting with
colleagues promotes equality by revealing how similarly situated defen-
dants have been and would be treated by others in the agency. It also
exposes the prosecutor to the normative perspectives of colleagues who,
over time, have themselves been exposed to the expression of diverse
public concerns-by victims, defense lawyers, judges, the media and so
forth. Collegial consultation is therefore invaluable but, depending
upon the range of views represented in the collegial group, might yield
an excessively narrow view of the public interest. 211 Although it might
be unwise, if not improper, to seek advice on decisions in particular
cases from persons outside the office, prosecutors should actively pur-
sue new information and perspectives bearing on the values at stake in
the criminal justice process. This implies receptiveness to relevant
research findings212 and to normative preferences expressed by all
segments of the community.
209. Frequently, of course, victims and the police will press their views upon the prosecutor
without being asked. See Friedman, The Prosecutor: A Model for Role and Function, 1978
WASH. U.L.Q. 109, 131-32.
210. Similarly, police officers familiar with the defendant and the community might be able
to contribute to the prosecutor's decision on the need for a jail term in this case.
211. In a related context, Sissela Bok argues that collegial consultation tends to exclude views
of those persons likely to object to the group's values. S. BOK, supra note 153, at 91. One might
fear that office colleagues would uniformly reflect a narrow "conviction psychology," and that
consultation would invariably push the prosecutor in that direction. Such pressures surely exist,
and are very powerful. But their force can be overstated. See supra text accompanying notes
85-91.
212. Such as research on the efficacy of general deterrence, the influence of correctional




Consultation is important not only as a means of gathering relevant
facts and perspectives, but also as an aid in the prosecutor's reasoning
to a conclusion. Many problems facing prosecutors-like what punish-
ment is "just" and "right"-are moral problems. Prosecutors should
approach them from "the moral point of view." In the Vietnam Vet-
eran case, for example, that requires the student (subject to her super-
visor's acquiescence) to exercise moral autonomy and courage. She
should not worry about how others will judge her ("too soft") or how
it Will affect her future; she should worry about the impact of her
actions on others, and about the example she is setting for others.
Moral reasoning calls for "moral conversation," which can occur
with others or within oneself. 213 As Joseph Singer has written of
judicial decision making:
When [they] decide cases, they should do what we all do when
we face a moral decision. We identify a limited set of alter-
natives; we predict the most likely consequences of following
different courses of action; we articulate the values that are im-
portant in the context of the decision and the ways in which
they conflict with each other; we see what relevant people...
have said about similar issues; we talk with our friends; we
drink enormous amounts of coffee; we choose what to do.2 14
At base these decisions are personal, deeply intuitive21 5 and sometimes
agonizing. However, "[i]n the moral sphere it is always, finally, up to
us; nor is there anyone to whose steadier shoulders our burden of moral
judgment can be shifted." '216
c. Summary. Table Five217 can now be amended to show the (con-
straining) principle of parsimony, the prima facie presumption of penal
severity (against mitigation), and the process of moral conversation and
introspection.
213. See, e.g., S. BOK, supra note 153, at 90-108. For an argument that judicial decision
making calls for the same process as we use in making important moral decisions see Singer, The
Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 62 (1984).
214. Singer, supra note 213, at 65.
215. The prosecutor's "surrogate client" role suggests an analogy: Binder and Price main-
tain that clients are incapable of articulating the precise weight that they give to particular values
affecting their decisions. Only by an intuitive process can a person satisfactorily weigh the rele-
vant competing interests. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 159, at 149. But see Postema, supra
note 116, at 68 ("Judgment is neither a matter of simply applying general rules to particular cases
nor a matter of mere intuition. It is a complex faculty, difficult to characterize, in which general
principles or values and the particularities of the case both play important roles.").
216. Aiken, The Concept of Moral Objectivity, in MORALITY AND THE LANGUAGE OF CON-
DUCT 97 (H. Castaneda ed. 1963). For the view that there is an objective moral reality and,
therefore, "true" and "false" answers to moral dilemmas, see Moore, supra note 175, at 1152.
According to Moore "the anguish such dilemmas can provoke is appropriate. . . . [It] expresses
our ... conviction that the answers are not equally arbitrary and that getting it right matters." Id.
at 1151 n.203.
217. See supra text accompanying note 183. Additions to Table 5 are italicized.
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C. Further Applications of the Model
In this section I shall apply my model to two prosecutorial dilem-




and other than sentencing. I shall not attempt exhaustive discussion of
the problems; I only wish to show how the model shapes our thinking
about them.
1. "Highest and Most" Charging: Feticide as Murder?-A man
badly beat his pregnant ex-wife, causing the death of her viable fetus.
The prosecutor could simply charge the man with the aggravated assault
and battery of his ex-wife, 21 8 or he could add a murder charge for the
death of the fetus. Most courts addressing the issue have refused to con-
strue "person" or "human being" in traditional homicide statutes to
include fetuses, while a few have approved a broader reading. 219 In a
case of first impression, should the prosecutor charge murder and urge
the state courts to construe the statute expansively?
According to our model the prosecutor has a prima facie duty to
prefer penal severity. In the sentencing context, this translates into a
prima facie duty to advocate punishment according to defendant's
desert, without mitigation. Thus the prosecutor should advocate the
maximum deserved penalty within the established range for the par-
ticular offense.
220
In the charging context, where the primary uncertainty relates to
definition of the potential penalty range, the preference for severity
might be expressed by presumptions in favor of "highest and most"
charging and broad construction of substantive penal laws. As modi-
fied by the principle of parsimony, these would imply a prima facie
duty to charge the most serious crime for which the defendant deserves
punishment. If the evidence suggests that the feticide was intentional or
reckless, this would mean a charge of murder.
The prosecutor's place in the adversary system seems, at first
blush, to require this stance. Defense counsel will nearly always argue
for the "lowest and least" charges. In this case, he will forcefully urge
the considerations of fair notice and separation of powers that oppose
judicial application of criminal homicide statutes to feticide. If the
prosecutor does not vigorously take the other side, nobody will. There-
fore, the argument might run, the prosecutor should push the more
serious charge and "leave it to the court."
Bringing the murder charge is justifiable but not, I think,
obligatory. I would oppose application of the two charging presump-
218. A charge of unlawful abortion might also lie. See Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652
S.W.2d 61, 64-68 (Ky. 1983) discussed in Comment, Taking Roe to the Limits: Treating Viable
Feticide as Murder, 17 InD. L. REV. 1119, 1134-36 (1984).
219. See generally Note, Judicial Recognition of Feticide: Usurping the Power of the Legis-
lature?, 24 J. FAm. L. 43 (1985) (discussing Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467
N.E.2d 1324 (1984) and State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984)).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
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tions in this case for two reasons. The first reason, having to do with
adversary system safeguards, applies to charge decisions generally; the
second is specific to fetal homicide.
The prosecutor's preference for severity is only justified by her
adversary role. By choosing to act as an adversary the prosecutor
implicitly says: "I know that my duty is to do justice, not merely to
convict. But in an adversary system, I serve justice best if I take an
adversary role, and rely upon opposing counsel and the judge to ensure
that justice will be done." 221 If adversary safeguards are inadequate to
protect justice values in the charging context, then the prosecutor's
reliance on them is misplaced.
Defense counsel's ability to protect the values threatened by a fetal
murder charge is questionable. He can do nothing until the defendant
is before a court. By then even counsel's successful objections would
not completely undo the harm-the stigma and anxiety-caused by the
charge. And if he failed to win pretrial dismissal of the charge, defense
counsel might feel compelled to advise a compromise plea rather than
a trial to vindicate basic rights.
My other reason has to do with the merits of this case. A judicial
decision to punish feticide under traditional homicide statutes, insofar as
it tends toward judicial "crime creation," controversially affects the
separation of legislative and judicial powers. 222 Because such a deci-
sion might leave unclear the criminal liability of others who cause the
death of fetuses-such as careless pregnant women and abortionists-it
could also substantially affect law enforcement. 223 As an elected execu-
tive official, the district attorney has a legitimate interest in encouraging
or opposing such a development. Ideally, then, this question should be
decided by high officials of the prosecution agency as a matter of
policy, and not "automatically" by resort to a preference for severity.
221. Seymour, supra note 128, at 312-13.
222. The line between (legitimate) judicial interpretation which expands a criminal statute's
coverage, and (illegitimate) creation of a "new" common law crime, is ill-defined. Compare
Keeler v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 619, 631-32, 470 P.2d 617, 624-25, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 488-89
(1970) (superseded by statute) with People v. Sobiek, 30 Cal. App. 3d 458, 106 Cal. Rptr. 519
(1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973) discussed in Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Con-
struction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 226-34 (1985). Because we consider crime-
definition a legislative function, the former infringes on legislative prerogatives as well as the
principle of legality. Cf Note, supra note 219, at 53-58.
223. The criminal law generally considers that an unborn fetus is not a person. Reform by
the legislature can anticipate and confine the effects of such fundamental change more easily than
can judicial action. Compare Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 644-45, 470 P.2d at 633-34, 87 Cal. Rptr. at




Lacking guidance from above, an assistant district attorney should
approach it the same way. She might in the end decide that the public
interest would best be served by applying murder statutes to feticide.
But first she should weigh the full range of relevant interests, accepting
that some of these might outweigh the interest in punishing the defen-
dant as a murderer.
The same approach should be applied by the prosecutor to the next
dilemma.
2. The "Public Safety" Exception to Miranda-A defendant
attacks her conviction on the ground that the jury was permitted to con-
sider her statement in response to police questioning, made without
benefit of Miranda warnings. 224 The questioning occurred at the arrest
scene late at night near a large apartment complex where several serious
crimes had been committed in the past few weeks. On the night in
question, a woman whose description the defendant matched had used
a kitchen knife in an attempt to kidnap a young man from the complex.
Her incriminating statement was in response to the question, "Where's
the knife? ' 2
25
On appeal, the prosecutor could defend admission of the statements
under the "public safety" exception to Miranda. The argument would
rest upon a broad reading of Quarles v. New York, 226 but-particularly
before a court inclined to restrict Miranda's scope-would not be an
implausible one. Assuming it raises an issue of first impression, should
the prosecutor make the argument?
In some respects this case resembles the feticide case just dis-
cussed. The question there was whether the prosecutor's adversary role
justifies presumptively broad construction of the substantive criminal
224. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
225. People v. Cole, 165 Cal. App. 3d 41, 52, 211 Cal. Rptr. 242, 248-49 (Ct. App. 1985)
(applying the Quarles v. New York, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) rationale on facts similar to those given
in the text).
226. Quarles v. New York, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), upheld custodial police questioning-
without warnings-because it was "reasonably necessary" to avert imminent danger to the public
arising from the concealed presence of a firearm in supermarket shelves. The Quarles emergency
was stronger than here because in Quarles the police were certain that the dangerous object was
present in the immediate area, and because that object was a loaded firearm. Neither is true in our
case. Still, considering that when he was questioned Quarles was held handcuffed at gun-point by
several police officers, it was the middle of the night and the store could easily have been cordoned
off and searched without risk to the public, it is difficult to read Quarles as motivated more by a
concern for public safety than by a wish to eviscerate Miranda. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 675-77
(Marshall, J. dissenting). See also Annotation, What Circumstances Fall Within "Public Safety"
Exception to Requirement That Law Enforcement Officer Give Persons Miranda Warnings as to
Federal Constitutional Rights Before Conducting Custodial Interrogation, 81 A.L.R. 2d 990
(1986).
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law; here the same question exists about a presumption in favor of nar-
rowly construing procedural protections. 227 Perhaps this question, too,
should be decided by the agency leadership (or in default, by the
litigating assistant) according to whether they believe that Miranda
should be preserved. They might, or might not, decide that claims of
crime control and substantive justice outweigh-in either the short or
long term228-the procedural values jeopardized by expanding Quarles.
Stronger arguments probably favor an adversary posture here.
Unlike the feticide issue, this one arises in the midst of adversary pro-
ceedings. A lower court has already admitted the evidence and con-
victed the defendant. Barring clear error, the appellate prosecutor
should presume regularity 229 and defend the state's position, relying on
defense counsel to argue the many reasons why Quarles should be con-
strued narrowly. A different conclusion might follow if the legal issue
arose at the trial court level, rather than on appeal.
D. Summary
Application of the model outside the sentencing context reinforces
several central arguments of this Article. Justice is the prosecutor's
primary goal, but in contexts where adversary system safeguards func-
tion, the prosecutor has the primary duty to advance crime control
values. In these contexts, the values of substantive justice, procedural
justice and equality operate as vital but muted constraints.
In this part I have attempted to critique the traditional view of the
prosecutor's dual role. Table Six23o is not simple, but I think it tells a
more coherent tale than Table One.231 I shall next consider the implica-
tions of this model for the operation of prosecution agencies.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROSECUTION AGENCIES
I have focused above on the individual prosecutor's dual role and
the pressures on her to renounce quasi-judicial values in favor of pursu-
227. Actually, both cases involve the tension between substantive and procedural justice: the
feticide defendant's defense would in part rely on the procedural due process right to notice.
228. See Skolnick, supra note 54, at 51-52 (police justify committing perjury by utilitarian
calculus measuring "costs of the act of lying against the benefits [from conviction] to the crime
victim and the general public"; civil libertarians use the same calculus but measure "in terms of
rules protecting the long-range interests of all citizens in a system of governance, as opposed to
the shorter range interests of punishing perpetrators.").
229. Prosecutors, like other government officials, should presume the validity of official
actions which would result in punishment. This may overlap with, but is distinct from, the
preference for severity.
230. See supra text accompanying note 217.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
Virtuous Prosecutor
ing penal severity. In this part, I examine the implications of that
discussion for prosecution agencies.
The prosecution model set forth above is meant to be normative,
but I think it also describes how-at some level of consciousness-most
prosecutors actually make decisions. The model asserts that even the
lowliest prosecutor exercises great discretionary power over the lives of
others. This, I have urged, demands a high level of individual moral
responsibility. One response might be, "This is too much power for
lawyers, especially young lawyers, to have. By detailed guidelines, in-
tensive supervision and the like, we should drastically limit their discre-
tionary power." As discussed earlier, 232 those methods have not been
much used to date. Furthermore, it is probably unrealistic to expect
any change. Leif Carter, an organizational analyst, has argued that
prosecutorial decision making is inherently uncontrollable by pre-
ordained rules and guidelines. 233 In his important study of California
prosecutors, he demonstrated that prosecutorial work is characterized
by such uncertainty-regarding, e.g., the causes of crime and the im-
pact of penalties, the constantly changing "facts" of cases, the diverse
and conflicting pressures from the work environment, the unpredictable
behavior of judges, witnesses and other actors-that efforts to define
and enforce uniform policies are bound to fail. 234 Instead of trying to
restrict prosecutors' autonomy, Carter concludes, agencies should ac-
cept individual discretion as a "given" and adapt to it. He recom-
mends that district attorneys should hire subordinates who, regardless
of their views of the best approach to crime control, have the interest
and ability to do criminal justice research and to share new knowledge
with their peers. Prosecutors should be individuals committed to con-
tinual learning in an atmosphere of uncertainty, openness, and inquiry;
research should be part of their job. 235
Carter's "philosopher-king" model of prosecution might be
impractical, but it points in the right direction. Prosecution agencies
should actively foster responsible exercise of inherent discretion by
subordinates. Such an approach would differ from the current one.
Most prosecutors come to the job directly from law school and stay
only a few years. Typically thrown into the "pit" without adequate
training or supervision, they become absorbed in mastering the knowl-
232. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
233. L. CARTER, supra note 36, at 11-17. Accord Utz, supra note 85, at 119-20.
234. L. CARTER, supra note 36, at 113-50. Among other causal factors, Carter cites the pro-
fessional independence of prosecutors, who resist control of their professional autonomy, and
whose behavior can be rewarded or punished by forces outside the agency. Id.
235. Id.
255
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edge and techniques of survival. Unprepared technically as they are,
they are even less prepared to handle their suddenly acquired power
over human lives. 236 Most of these neophytes come fresh from the
moral fragmentation and alienation of law school, and many feel "cut
away from themselves" 237 even before they arrive. They are eager for
someone to tell them "how to do it," a safer and less painful course
than forming and asserting their own judgments, whether on matters of
police credibility or-Heaven forbid-" justice." But if competent
prosecution demands the integration of personal values and professional
sldlls, then prosecution agencies must encourage prosecutors to reunite
their personal and professional selves, which many learned to separate
as students. 238 The question is how to do this.
A suitable program would involve recruitment, training, and rein-
forcement. I shall discuss each of these in light of the analysis set forth
in the first three parts of this Article.
A. Recruitment
Recruitment patterns, like other aspects of prosecution in this coun-
try, vary. 239 Some district attorneys hire and fire assistants on merit,
others favor candidates who are politically connected, and some-
probably the majority-do both. 240 To the extent that merit counts,
who should be recruited?
236. This picture might be exaggerated for the large agencies, which I think tend to supervise
neophyte prosecutors more closely. However, the description does apply to many agencies. Com-
pared to most of their peers beginning law practice, prosecutors-even in the lower courts where
they are apt to start-quickly get great responsibility over lives of defendants and victims.
237. Elkins, Rites de Passage: Law Students Telling Their Lives, 35 J. LEGAL EDUc. 27,
30-31, 44-47 (1985). Elkins and others have studied this phenomenon in first year law students.
Cf Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal Education,
8 J. LEGAL REFORM 248 (1975). But, as Elkins maintains, the "split of public and private self,
[although] costly and difficult to maintain, [is] carried into professional life." Elkins, supra, at
46.
238. In the words of one student:
In the law office your professional self is on display. I don't see anything wrong with
this separation of personal and professional. So what if you have to act sort of phony
to get the work done. It's all part of the game, and people have to accept it in order to
function.
Elkins, supra note 237, at 46.
239. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 44, at 74.
240. For example, patterns might vary according to agency size. See generally Kuh, supra
note 33, at 181-82. In my limited experience, large urban agencies are less likely to be "polit-
ical" than smaller, suburban ones. In eastern Massachusetts, political considerations seem to
dominate hiring and tenure in some counties, and matter only peripherally in others. One can
speculate that "all other things being equal" the son or daughter of a key legislator or big con-
tributor to the district attorney's campaign fund would have a competitive edge in every office.
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If substantial prosecutorial autonomy is inherent in our system,
then certainly it makes sense to anticipate that fact in recruitment.
Prosecutors, more than other lawyers, must have a strong personal
sense of justice and be morally autonomous. Recruiters should pay as
much attention to these qualities as to the candidate's legal skills or how
her physical appearance will strike the jury.
24 1
Granted, qualities like "moral character" and "devotion to jus-
tice" are difficult to assess, especially under conditions of initial hiring.
Also, as history suggests, such criteria can easily mask arbitrariness and
discrimination in hiring. 24 2  These are serious difficulties. Yet the
failure to consider these central qualities in recruitment is even more
troubling. If nothing else, an agency's hiring criteria reveal its
operating values and priorities to potential recruits and the community
at large. Therefore, they help establish expectations for prosecutorial
conduct.
243
B. Training and Supervision
Careful training is obviously an essential ingredient of any program
to induce proper prosecutorial conduct. This requires both orientation
training for new prosecutors-which many agencies lack244-and
follow-up training for the experienced. The scope and content of exist-
ing programs is not known, but I suspect that they tend to focus on
imparting technical knowledge and skills. Such training probably
covers jurisdiction, procedure, advocacy skills, sentencing rules and the
correctional system-doctrinal mastery of law and technique-but no
general orientation to ethics, role, or the agency's place in the criminal
justice system. Familiarity with these subjects tends to be assumed.
But if an agency wants prosecutors to take their dual role seriously, it
should expressly orient them to it, prepare them for the conflicts they
will experience, and give them a conceptual framework for conflict
resolution.
An aside: the impact of campaign funding patterns on the behavior of prosecution agencies has
not, to my knowledge, been studied. Who contributes to district attorney election campaigns, and
what do they expect in return?
241. See L. CARTER, supra note 36, at 162.
242. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JusTICE, 40-73 (1976) (use of ethics codes to keep new immi-
grants out of legal profession).
243. Increasingly, it seems, prosecution agencies question job applicants about ethical dilem-
mas. Our students often prepare for interviews by discussing "proper" responses to problems
asked previously. This process surely affects their perception of the agency's priorities.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 35-45.
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More specifically, according to the analysis in parts II and III of
this Article, training should include the following:
1. The rules of professional responsibility applicable to all lawyers
in their jurisdiction, as well as the special rules and standards applicable
to prosecutors and criminal defense counsel.
245
2. The prosecutor's special duty arising from her role as "sur-
rogate client" for the public. 246 This would include consideration of:
a. the public interests relevant to criminal law enforcement,
emphasizing both crime control and justice;
247
b. the elements of justice;
248
c. conflicts between the goals of crime control and justice, and
among the different elements of justice;249 and
d. the individual's moral responsibility for resolving conflict-
ing public interests.
250
3. The prosecutor's prima facie duty, arising from her role in the
adversary system, to presume factual guilt and advocate maximum
severity, and the limits on that duty.
251
4. The need at times to resist pressure from the police, the public
or oneself to prefer substantive justice252 over procedural justice or
equality.
5. The distinction between proper prosecutorial conduct and con-
duct which meets minimal constitutional "fair trial" standards.
253
C. Reinforcement
Like other workers, professionals are socialized by peers and
supervisors on the job, rather than in formal training programs. If the
role expectations communicated to new prosecutors in recruitment and
initial training are different from those applied in practice, the latter
will prevail. Consequently, an agency must create an internal climate
which reinforces the behavior it wants to foster. The means for doing
so-after initial training-include case supervision, promotion and ten-
ure review, and continuing education. The last category might encom-
245. Such as the STANDARDS, supra note 1 and the NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOClA-
TION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 71.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 116-122.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 161-69.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 171-73, 187-95.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 173-82, 184.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 143-54, 193-208.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 70-83.
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pass a wide range of measures from circulating pertinent rules and court
opinions to holding workshops on ethical problems facing attorneys in
the office.
A climate supportive of the prosecutor's dual role can be estab-
lished by three kinds of action.254 First, the agency leadership should
make clear that amassing convictions is not the agency's sole or highest
value and that assistants can be disciplined 255 for overzealousness as
well as underzealousness. It must be clear that obedience to clear rules
of professional responsibility is expected as a matter of office policy,
even if no conviction is jeopardized or scandal caused. A prosecutor's
knowledge that flagrant rule violations might trigger internal discipline
strengthens her impulse to act properly and counters external pressures
to seek conviction at all costs.
Second, the agency should create structures for identifying policy
issues facing prosecutors and addressing them on an agency level.
These issues range from broad ("What sentences should we seek in
domestic violence cases?") to narrow ("Should feticide be prosecuted
as criminal homicide?"), and might elicit responses of varying specif-
icity. Policy questions should be considered and resolved in a format
and at a level of agency hierarchy appropriate to the issue. For exam-
ple, the feticide issue calls for a definitive response, 256 which should
probably come from the highest level of the agency. On the other
hand, complex issues like sentencing policy in domestic violence cases
might call for the development of internal guidelines by a broad-based
group of staff, which could then be submitted for approval at the
highest agency level. Such guidelines would not reveal the "right"
sentence in any case, but rather direct prosecutors' attention to the rele-
vant factors. 25
7
Facilitating reference "upward" of troubling policy questions
serves two major functions. First, it encourages and legitimates
dialogue within the agency on recurrent issues of prosecution policy. 258
Second, it clarifies the boundaries of prosecutorial discretion, for exam-
ple, "Assistants must/may/may not charge reckless feticide as criminal
homicide," or "Assistants may/may not condition dismissal of charges
on defendant's waiver of civil claims against the police." Many of
254. Some agencies already do this and more. Many, it seems, do not.
255. I use "discipline" loosely to refer to the disincentives available to agencies to discourage
behavior by subordinates. These include, for example, work assignments and tenure.
256. The agency might decide to leave the question to the discretion of individual prosecutors,
but letting "a hundred flowers bloom" would create serious problems of inequality.
257. See, e.g., Middlesex County (Massachusetts), Domestic Violence Sentencing Guidelines
(Final Draft, unpublished 1984).
258. See generally K. DAvIs, supra note 36, at 246.
AM. J. CRIM. LAW
these issues are politically sensitive and difficult to resolve. But agency
heads who shrink from confronting these issues can hardly expect to in-
spire moral courage in their subordinates.
Finally, the agency should seek to reinforce the responsible exer-
cise of discretion by fostering dialogue about ongoing cases. This can
occur both in individual supervision and in groups. 25 9 For example,
one Massachusetts district attorney260 holds staff workshops to discuss
hypotheticals (distributed in advance) raising common professional
responsibility problems. He also requires assistants periodically to
write him memoranda describing difficult professional responsibility
issues they have recently faced and how they resolved them. Such
devices can teach an approach to prosecution, rather than ethical rules
or right answers. That approach requires prosecutors to be sensitive to
the existence of conflicting interests and to weigh those interests in light
of legal rules, agency policy and their own values. Fostering "moral
conversation" about ongoing cases serves this goal by sensitizing staff
to the issues, exposing them to different models of response, and
legitimating conscientious efforts to identify and implement just
solutions.
D. Conclusion
I have argued that:
1. Our tendency to describe the prosecutor's duty to "seek
justice" in overly vague terms invites "overzealousless";
2. instilling in prosecutors a more coherent vision of their quasi-
judicial duty and its relation to their duty of "zealous advocacy" would
strengthen their ability to resist pressures to adopt a "conviction men-
tality"; and
3. agencies should reinforce the desire of their prosecutors to do
justice by such devices as recruitment, training and supervision.
A critic of my argument might respond:
By the time someone graduates from law school his sense of
justice is pretty well developed. It is famous to expect, for
example, that explaining to prosecutors that "justice" consists
of desert, procedural fairness and equality will tell them
anything they don't already know. As Justice Jackson said,
"those who need to be told would not understand it
anyway."
261
259. Cf. Lee, Ethics and the Megafirm, 16 Loy. U. Cni. L.J. 492, 496 (1985) (advocating
training programs involving "continual reexamination by the individual attorneys of their com-
petence" as a strategy for dealing with ethical problems in large law firms).
260. District Attorney Scott Harshbarger of Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
261. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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In one sense this point is correct. We intuitively recognize injustice,
and no charts or lectures can guide us better than this recognition.
262
But we also know the power of the first year in law school to destroy
one's moral compass. The indoctrinating power of professional role
models is not less forceful. Helping new prosecutors to articulate and
to act on what they already "know" is a weighty counter-force.
A second, more telling criticism of my argument concerns its prac-
ticality. "Even if one believes all three propositions stated above,"
argues the reader, "your suggestions are impractical. Prosecutors
would resist training of this sort, and prosecution agencies, always
underfunded, could not afford the necessary resources." Given current
staffing practices, the resistance point is well taken. A young career
prosecutor might be motivated to think, talk and agonize over justice
and moral responsibility, but one who has joined the office seeking
eighteen months of trial experience might only want to know about
nuts, bolts, and how to avoid disbarment. The growing attractiveness
of careers in prosecution offers some comfort on this score.
263
The resource objection is weighty, but applies of course to almost
every suggested improvement in criminal justice. Most likely, numer-
ous agencies already practice the measures proposed here as "re-
forms." As their experiences are studied and shared, we will know
better what works and how much it costs.
262. On the place of emotion and intuition in moral judgment, see Moore, supra note 175, at
1135-36.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47, 91. As the cover of a national magazine
recently proclaimed, this is "The Age of the D.A." The Age of the D.A., INSIGHT, July 6, 1987,
at cover.
